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ABSTRACT
The NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) is a space-
based navigation system scheduled to be fully operational by
1990. GPS User Equipment (UE) is scheduled for installation
on Navy ships commencing 1987. This thesis examines plans
to incorporate GPS UE on Military Sealift Command (MSC)
ships. The Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force and Special Mission
Support ships have been funded and scheduled for military
GPS UE. Plans for Strategic Sealift and Miscellaneous
Service Support ships have not yet been made. Alternatives
for equipping these ships with either commercial or military
GPS UE are examined. Primary recommendations for MSC ships
when GPS is operational v/ith two-dimensional coverage (by
the end of 1987) are:
(1) equip Strategic Sealift ships with military GPS UE,
(2) include GPS navigation equipment in ship enhancement
programs, and
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I . I NTRODUCTION
A. OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE
This thesis reviews and evaluates plans to incorporate
NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) User Equipment (UE)
on Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships in the MSC Fleet
Inventory and in the New Ship Construction/Conversion
Program. The scope is:
a. to identify MSC ships currently funded and scheduled
for military GPS UE installation considering the GPS
UE Installation Schedule (POM-86 Decision Package
[Ref. 1], the MSC Fleet Inventory [Ref. 2], and the
New Ship Construction/Conversion Program [Ref. 3]
.
b. to determine and evaluate alternatives for equipping
currently unfunded MSC ships with military or
commercial GPS UE in terms of mission requirements
taking into account technology required, equipment
characteristics and availability, schedules of
the GPS program, and Department of Defense (DOD)
navigation system phase-outs.
c. to present major considerations and implications of
choice in alternatives (military or commercial) of GPS
UE considered for all MSC ship groups.
Information in this thesis is applicable only to the
user equipment (UE) segment of GPS and its application to
MSC ships. However, the discussion and evaluation of
alternatives can also be applied to other services which
charter commercial platforms and service support craft.
This thesis does not provide a conclusive cost benefit
analysis comparing the alternatives of procuring and
10
installing GPS UE. Currently, commercial GPS UE for general
marine navigation has not been produced nor is it available.
More important, tvzo competing companies have submitted bids
in response to the request for proposal (RFP) released on
17 August 1984 by the Joint Program Office (JPO) for the
production and integration of military GPS. Because the
cont-ract has not yet been awarded, specific information and
costs are proprietary information for military GPS UE, and
are extremely competition-sensitive. As data is not yet
publicly available, an indepth cost benefit analysis could
not be conducted.
B. METHODOLOGY
Research methods used were personal interviews and a
review and study of pertinent literature and publications.
The majority of technical information concerning GPS and GPS
UE was provided by the GPS Joint Program Office in Los
Angeles, California; the ARINC Research Corporation in Santa
Ana, California; Magnavox in Torrence, California; Rockwell-
Collins in Cedar Rapids, Iowa; and Texas Instruments in
Lewisville, Texas. Information concerning the MSC was
provided by OPNAV-42 and MSC Headquarters in Washington, DC;
the MSC Pacific Area Command (MSCPAC) in Oakland,
California; and the MSC Office (MSCO) in Long Beach,
California.
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Two basic assumptions are made: first, GPS will be
operational and will replace currently existing navigation
systems; and second, MSC's mission will continue as
currently defined.
Discussions and conclusions are based on the author's
understanding of statements and comments gathered during
personal interviews and telephone conversations.
Conclusions and recommendations are drawn from the
interpretation of information available within the research
time frame (July to December 1984) . Additionally, they
reflect the author's personal experience, which included
operational tours at the Navy Space Surveillance System




Compared to star fixes, the quantum jump in navigation
on the high seas occurred with the operational use of the
TRANSIT system in 1964. By 1973, the wide variety of 120
navigation and positioning systems operated by DOD in terms
of both cost effectiveness and operational enhancement was
the driving force that resulted in a need for replacement of




GPS is a space-based radionavigation system under
tri-service/agency and North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) development. GPS is applicable to both military and
civil communities. It is designed to provide continuous,
all-weather positioning information at any time of day to an
unlimited number of suitably equipped users located anywhere
on or out to 500 miles from the earth's surface. GPS
provides highly accurate three-dimensional (latitude,
longitude, and altitude) positioning (to within 16 meters
spherical error of probability (SEP) ) , velocity (to within
0.05 meters/second), and system time (to within 55
nanoseconds) [Ref. 4:p. 2].
Currently GPS is in Phase II, full scale development.
DSARC III decision milestone for Phase III production, is
scheduled for the fourth quarter (QTR) calendar year (CY)
1985 [Ref. 5] . Full approval is anticipated [Ref. 6]
.
GPS is to become the primary DOD radionavigation system.
Committed to GPS, DOD plans to phase-out the use and
operation of existing radionavigation systems. As of










The BOD policy for TRANSIT is to terminate TRANSIT
operations as GPS becomes operational. The transition is
scheduled to start in 1987 and by the end of 1994 [Ref . 7]
,
"TRANSIT will be off the air as far as the Department of
Defense is concerned. ...We have indicated that as GPS
comes on line, we in the DOD will no longer have a need for
TRANSIT and we plan on getting out of the TRANSIT business.
We intend, in fact, to shut down TRANSIT." [Ref. 8:p. 107]
As a fallout of the GPS development, and because the GPS
is expected to eventually replace existing navigation
systems, anyone who uses navigation is a potential user.
This is true for the mainstream Navy fleet as well as for
logistic support and special mission ships.
Implicit in the funded military GPS UE installation
schedule (POM-86 Decision Package) , the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) has determined and identified the need for
military GPS UE funding and installation on Navy aircraft,
ship and vehicle platforms. The mainstream high priority
platforms (e.g., U.S. Navy carrier) are already scheduled
14
for funding and installation of GPS UE. Military GPS UE is
to be installed on U.S. Navy ships beginning in 1987 and
continuing until the mid-1990 's. [Ref. 1]
The Military Sealift Command (MSC) is a fleet command
and the Navy Operating Agency for Ocean Transportation.
Recently MSC's role as the nation's strategic arm of defense
has been formally recognized. The U.S. Navy now has three
major functions: sealift, sea control, and power
projection. Until recently the U.S. Navy had two major
functions: sea control and sea power. On 13 March 1984,
the Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, formally declared
sealift as being the Navy's third major function.
[Ref. ll:p. 2]
During the several years leading up to this formal
recognition, MSC's mission of contingency-related strategic
sealift was increasingly emphasized vis-a-vis its
traditional peacetime role [Ref. 12:p. 38] . Additionally,
contingency preparedness, sealift readiness, and strategic
sealift have been given a surge of attention. In
March 1981, CNO Admiral Thomas Hayward warned a House Armed
Services Committee sub-committee that "without adequate and
reliable sealift, literally none of our military plans is
executable." [Ref. 12:p. 40]
By 1984, the Strategic Sealift Division (OP-42) was
established as part of the Office of the Deputy Chief of
15
Naval Operations (DCNO) for Logistics (OP-04) . Vice Admiral
T.J. Hughes, Jr., OP-04, stated "Logistics half way is no
good," and added, " . . . $6 billion over the next five years is
going to OP-42 . " [Ref. 13]
As of 19 October 1984, the MSC Fleet Inventory consisted




Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force (NFAF)
Special Mission Support (SMS)








Additionally, 56 ships are in the New Ship Construction/
Conversion Program. Eight ships are planned as replacements
for existing ships and 48 ships will be added to the MSC
fleet. 5
Most of the NFAF and SMS ships have been funded and are
scheduled for military GPS UE installation under the POM-86
Decision Package (hereafter referred to as POM-86) [Ref. 1]
.
The STRAT and MSS ship groups, particularly the STRAT ship
16
group, have not been considered for military GPS UE to date
[Refs. 14;15]
.
MSC ships use TRANSIT and OMEGA for primary ocean
navigation, and LORAN-C (v/here available) for primary
coastal navigation [Ref. 9:pp. 18-19], all of which are
scheduled for DOD phase-out in the 1990 *s. This makes MSC
ships candidates for either military or commercial GPS UE
.
In view of the identified need for military GPS UE aboard
naval platforms (as well as on multi-service platforms) , and
the emphasis being placed on strategic sealift, there is a
need for insuring that all MSC ships are considered for GPS
UE and that a decision is made as to whether to provide them
with military or commercial GPS UE. For military GPS UE, it
is recognized that the required number of GPS UE sets will
not be appreciable (approximately 8 to 111) in terms of the
total number of sets the Navy will procure (7453) [Ref. 1]
.
However, the role of MSC in defense of the nation dictates
that its ships be given adequate consideration in the
implementation plans for procurement of GPS UE.
17
FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER I
!The Federal Radionavigation Plan (FRP) , the
official source of navigation policy and planning for DOD
and Department of Transportation (DOT) , states that by 1986
a national decision is to be made for navigation systems
[Ref. 9:p. 55]. The effective FRP is dated 1982. the
revised version, already signed by DOT, is expected to be
signed by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) by the end of
1984 [Ref. 10]
.
2 Sources: [Refs. 7;8:pp. 107-108 ; 9 :pp. 28-42].
3A11 DOD service plans call for phase-out of LORAN-C
requirements and overseas LORAN-C funding. DOT expects to
continue LORAN-C operation for continental coastal areas
until the year 2000. [Refs. 7;9:p. 28] The Army and Air
Force will phase-out military use of OMEGA by 1992. The
Navy has possible limited use of OMEGA beyond 19 92, and
intends to re-evaluate use of OMEGA as a backup to GPS for
selected platforms when GPS is fully operational
[Ref. 9:p. 32]
4 MSC Fleet Inventory dated 19 October 1984 [Ref. 2].
Includes 140 active and reserve* ships and 24 inactive ships
in the MSC controlled fleet plus. 47 ships (Maritime
Administration (MARAD) assets) which are operated by MSC
when activated) . See Chapter II and Appendix A for
additional information.
-'Reference 3 of October 1984 is used as basic
information. The author has used 56 ships to reflect
delivery of the third T-AGOS and second MPS as per Reference
2. Also, two new construction T-AGS ships are assumed
throughout thesis (Chapter II), as replacements for USNS
Bowditch and USNS Dutton.
18
II • GP S_ PROGRAM. ANP_MSC_ ORGANIZATION
A. GPS PROGRAM
The Global Positioning System (GPS) is a joint program
as directed by DOD. The Air Force is designated as the
executive (lead) service. Major participants include the
Navy, Army, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Department of
Transportation (DOT) , Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) , and
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
.
GPS has been under development since 1973. The impetus
for GPS was the potential for a universal positioning and
navigation system which could meet the needs of a broad
spectrum of users. Additionally, definite cost savings
would accrue by reducing the proliferation of specialized
equipment responsive only to particular mission
requirements. [Ref. 16]
1 • GPS_Prpcj r am_ Orcjani zat ipn
The GPS program is managed by the GPS Program
Manager (PM) ,6 at the Office of Primary Responsibility .
(OPR) . The PM is assigned to plan, organize, coordinate,
control, and direct the GPS program. Currently the GPS PM,
a USAF colonel, is also head of the Joint Program Office
(JPO) at the USAF Space Division. The JPO organization is
one PM, an executive office, six directorates, and seven
19
deputy program managers (DPMs). Personnel from each
participating service, agency, and NATO are assigned to
directorates and DPMs to coordinate extensive program
participation and to facilitate integrated program
management (Figure 2-1)
.
Key agencies and organizational players in the GPS
program are:
a. Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) : The PM at the
OPR has full management responsibilities including
operational/support configuration management and final
approval authority for the overall GPS program. The
OPR during development of the GPS program and during
transition (prior and up to the PMRT7 date) is the
JPO. The OPR becomes the Joint Service System
Management Office (JSSMO) after Program Management
Responsibility Transfer (PMRT) . The JPO (JSSMO after
PMRT) , is the final approval authority for all
proposed changes submitted by the respective services
or contractors, or initiated by the OPR.
b. Services Involved: The primary GPS users are the
USAF, USA, USN, USMC, DOT, DMA, and NATO. Each user
has a DPM assigned who reports to the JPO (JSSMO after
PRMT) as described above. [Ref. 17:pp. 33-37]
c. Contractors: Two contractors, Magnavox and Rockwell-
Collins, are involved in Phase II full scale
development of the GPS user equipment (UE) . In early
1985 one of the contractors will be awarded the
contract for Phase III production of GPS UE. This
will result in three contract management teams, with
one team for each major development/acquisition
contract. The contracts are associated with the three
program segments (space, control system, and user
equipment) [Ref. 18:p. 20].
d. Executive Services: The Air Force has been designated
as the executive service (single manager) for the GPS
program and is responsible for the centralized
management and configuration control of GPS hardware
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single manager policies which direct services to
centralize management and configuration control when
multi-services are involved.
In addition to the OPR (JPO/JSSMO) , major Air Force
commands and organizations involved in the GPS program
(Figure 2-2) are:
a. Headquarters USAF: Headquarters USAF provides
management of GPS computer resources and ensures
procedural consistency.
b. Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) : AFSC, Andrews Air
Force Base, Maryland, is responsible for the
development, acquisition, transfer, and turnover of
GPS. AFSC has delegated these functions to AFSC/Space
Division (SD)
.
c. AFSC/Space Division (SD) : AFSC/SD in Los Angeles,
California, was designated as the implementing
command. AFSC/SD formed the JPO to manage GPS
multi-service involvement and control resources
approved for acquisition.
d. Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) : AFLC implements
all applicable instructions, regulations, and
directives after PMRT (on completion of AFSC
turnover)
.
e. Warner Robbins Air Logistics Center (WRALC) : AFLC
designated WRALC, located at Robbins AFB in Georgia,
as the post-PMRT Systems Manager (SM) of JSSMO. Since
GPS is a joint service command, the Navy and Army will
have representatives at WRALC. [Ref. 17:pp. 36-37]
2 . GPS_Program_ Management
The GPS program management structure (Figure 2-3
depicts a simplified version)
,
provides the f ramework that
allows the PM to effectively run the program with respect to












Figure 2-2. Major Air Force Commands and Organizations
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GPS JCCB
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Figure 2-3. GPS Program Management (DOD Common)
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related to the interfaces between and within the major
system segments is essential to the development process.
The overall management of these interfaces, of the system
configuration, and of the program life cycle are
accomplished through the Joint Configuration Control Board
(JCCB) , which is composed of members representing all
services and agencies.
a. Joint Configuration Control Board: Any changes and
any new requirements are presented to the JCCB for
consideration. The JCCB, chaired by the PM or his
designated representative, is the official agency to
act on all changes. Final approval for any change
rests with the PM. 8 The JCCB will be located with
the PM [Ref . 18:p. 20]
.
b. User Equipment Joint Configuration Control Board (UE
JCCB) and User Equipment Computer Configuration
Sub-Board (UE CSSB) : These boards approve changes on
user equipment which do not impact on the space or the
control segments.
c. Navy Program Manager (NPM) (specifically, PME 106-2
for NAVELEX, PME 106) : NPM is the single interface
between the Navy GPS program management structure and
the JPO (specifically, the Navy DPM) prior to PMRT,
(JSSMO after PMRT). [Ref. 17:p. 40]
3 . Nayy_GPS_Program, Relationships
The wide and diverse application of all three types
of military GPS UE sets on Navy aircraft, ships, submarines,
and ground vehicles involves a wide spectrum of Navy
organizations, including the three systems commands (MAVAIR,
NAVSEA, and NAVELEX) and the Chief of Naval Material
(NAVMAT) . The purpose of the Navy GPS program is to ensure
25
commonality and standardization of hardware and software in
Navy-unique UE, and to provide support to the Air Force in
maintaining commonality and standardization for DOD common
UE.
Major Navy GPS program management relations for
identifying changes and requirements (Figure 2-4) are:
a. NAVELEX (PME 106) : PME 106 has overall responsibility
and authority for the Navy GPS program and is
responsible for the total Navy acquisition and
engineering management of Navy GPS UE.
b. Navy Program Manager (NPM) , PME 106-2: PME 106-2 is
directly responsible to PME 106 for all GPS matters
and interfaces. As described above, PME 106-2 is the
interface between the Navy GPS program and the overall
DOD GPS program. PME 106-2 is also responsible for
Navy technical requirements for Navy GPS UE
development and provides Navy technical inputs for GPS
UE. After PMRT, PME 106-2 will submit requirements to
JSSMO. (Currently, OP-943 submits requirements to the
Navy DPM at JPO.) PME 106-2 is assisted technically
by the systems commands.
c. Navy Configuration Control Board (NCCB) : The NCCB
becomes effective at PMRT and will be chaired by
PME 106-2. The NCCB will manage Navy requests for
changes and new requirements and be responsible for
Navy GPS UE configuration management through the life
cycle of GPS. [Ref. 17:pp. 37,43,45]
Major Navy GPS program organizational relations to
identify funding and installation for military GPS UE on
Navy host vehicles are depicted in Figure 2-5 and described
below. The example used is for an MSC Maritime Preposition-
ing Ship (MPS) , although currently this ship type is not



































































































































































a. Navy GPS Program Sponsor: The Navy Space Systems
Division, OP-943 (under CNO Command and Control,
OP-094) , is the GPS Program Sponsor for the Navy.
Annually, 'OP-943 requests in writing the program
sponsors the number of GPS UE sets needed and the
timeframe for UE installation. Current program
sponsors include OP-02, OP-03 , and OP-05. In this
example the program sponsor is OP-04, Deputy Chief of
Naval Operations for Logistics) .9 The program
sponsors then forward the request to the appropriate
platform sponsors. For an MPS the platform sponsor is
OP-42, Strategic Sealift Division.
b. Military Sealift Command (MSC) and OP-42: MSC, as a
GPS user, and/or Op-42, as the platform sponsor also
could initiate the need for military GPS UE.
Coordination between CNO and PME 106-2 is needed to
identify and determine technical requirements. In any
event, the requirements are submitted to the program
sponsor (OP-04) who forwards them to OP-95.
c. Office of Naval Warfare, OP-95: OP-95, specifically
OP-954 (Strike and Amphibious Warfare Division)
,
approves the need for military GPS UE on the vehicle;
validates, consolidates, and prioritizes all
requirements; and plans when and how many UE sets
should be installed. The information is then
forwarded to OP-943. OP-943 plans an initial
budget, and forwards requirements and priorities (by
ship class) to the Navy DPM at JPO.
d. Navy Deputy Program Manager (Navy DPM): The Navy DPM
fits the required number of sets and priorities to the
budget constraints. In reality, there is very close
liaison between the Navy DPM and PME 106-2, CP-943,
and OP-95. The Navy DPM also coordinates requirements
with OP-436, the Fleet Modernization Branch of OP-43
(Ships Maintenance and Modernization Division) . The
end result is the preparation (for PME 106-2) of the
POM for military GPS UE funding and installation which
is forwarded to and then submitted by CNO in the
budget process. The Navy DPM also coordinates Navy
production requirements of military GPS UE sets.
e. NAVSEA and PME 106-2: After the POM is approved,
funds are provided to NAVSEA and PME 106-2 (via the
CNO sponsor and NAVMAT) for installation of equipment
onto the MSC ship. NAVSEA is responsible for the
29
installation on ships. The first installation in a
class of ships is given final testing by NAVSEA and
PME 106-2. PME 106-2 orders, via the contract let by
JPO, UE sets from the contractor after the sets have
been produced. There is close coordination between
NAVSEA, PME 106-2, and MSC for the installation
process.
4 . GPS_Prpcjram_ Schedule, and_ Status
GPS program development is divided into three
successive phases. Phase I (concept validation) , from 1973
to 1979, validated system performance and feasibility.
Emphasis was placed on designing modular hardware and
software to reduce development costs, and on using common
components in different host vehicle categories
[Ref. 4:p. 3]. During Phase I, four U.S. contractors
developed and demonstrated GPS UE sets for development,
test, and evaluation (DT&E) [Ref. 18:pp. 4,69].
Phase II (full scale development (FSD) ) , currently-
underway, is scheduled for completion during the fourth QTR
CY 1985 [Ref. 5] . Phase II verifies the operational
effectiveness of the GPS concept for both military and
civilian users and validates UE design [Ref. 17:p. 146]. At
the beginning of Phase II, two contractors (Magnavox and
Rockwell-Collins) were selected to competitively develop GPS
UE for a group of host vehicles designated by JPO for DT&E
and initial operation test and evaluation (IOT&E) activities
which began in 1982. The UE sets developed by both
30
contractors were tested in landbased, seaborne, and airborne
platforms. [Ref. 18':p. 22]
The Request for Proposal (RFP) , released
17 August 1984, is the anticipated production buy for the
first five years with a first year contract, and four
production options. The contract, estimated at $1 billion,
will be a fixed price incentive fee (FPIF) contract. The
results of the DT&E/IOT&E testing as well as cost,
1 producibility , ' and support considerations will lead to the
selection of one prime contractor. Source selection is now
in progress. JPO expects to award the contract during the
first QTR in CY 1985. [Ref. 16]
Full scale production of military GPS UE begins in
Phase III. A leader-follower (s) concept of procurement is
planned with the leader qualifying a second production
source (s) after the first production contract award
[Ref. p. 4] . This will provide both contractors the
opportunity to develop GPS UE production sets on a cost
competitive basis. JPO currently anticipates purchasing
approximately 23,400 GPS UE sets [Ref. 5].
Follow-on test and evaluation (FOT&E) will be
completed prior to installation of user equipment
[Ref. 4:p. 4]. UE sets produced during Phase III will be
installed on host vehicles on a prioritized basis
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[Ref. 18:p. 18]. Installation of production GPS UE sets on
military host vehicles will begin in 1986 and continue
through 'the 1990's [Ref. 18:p. 4]. U.S. Navy ships are
scheduled for installation beginning in 1987 [Ref. 1].
During Phase III, production satellites will be
launched from the space shuttle starting in 1986
[Ref. 20:p. 1187]. A ten to twelve satellite constellation
is planned for late 1987 providing two dimensional coverage.
The full eighteen satellite constellation, providing three
dimensional coverage, should be operational in 1989.
[Ref. 21:p. 74]
In summary, the three phased development and
deployment of the GPS is an evolutionary process. Each step
provides extensive legacy value for the next step.
Throughout this process, system level testing will be
accomplished in order to insure optimum system operation
[Ref. 4:p. 4]
.
B. MILITARY SEAL IFT COMMAND (MSC)
MSC, a U.S. Navy command with fleet status, provides
sealift. 10 Additionally, MSC is the Navy Operating
Agency for ocean transportation under the Secretary of the
Navy (SECNAV) , who is DOD's single manager for ocean
transportation [Ref. 22:p. 5] . MSC also sponsors naval
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control of shipping and convoy commodore staff naval reserve
units for the Naval Control of Shipping Organization
(NCSORG)
-
11 MSC operates in direct support of DOD
programs. In time of war, MSC shipping will be dictated by
world conditions and urgency of transportation requirements.
[Ref. 23:p. 1, para 5]
1 • Ql9 an1.Z at ipn
The MSC commander reports to the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) through the Strategic Sealift Division
(OP-42) , recently established in 1984. OP-42 , as part of
the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (DCNO)
for Logistics (OP-04) , develops policy and provides planning
support on matters concerning strategic mobility, sealift,
and maritime affairs. OP-42 is the primary focal point for
MSC on the CNO staff and within the Navy concerning sealift
matters. [Ref. ll:p. 7] Additionally, OP-42 is the primary
interface with the Maritime Administration (MARAD) and the
merchant marine industry [Ref. 24].
Dual-hatted as Assistant to Chief of Naval
Operations for Naval Control of Shipping (OP-06N) , the MSC
commander reports to DCNO of Plans, Policy and Operations
(OP-06) . In matters concerning procurement policy or
contracting for ships and transportation systems, and in
financial matters, the MSC commander reports to the
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Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower, Installation,
and Logistics (ASN MI&L) , and to the Assistant Secretary of
the Navy for Financial Management (ASN FM) (see Figure 2-6)
MSC is a world-wide organization with command
headquarters in Washington, DC. There are four area
commands: Yokohama, Japan; Oakland, California; Bayonne,
New Jersey; and Bremerhaven, Germany (Bremerhaven will .
relocate to London (Eastcote) , England in 1985
[Ref. 26 :p. 2]); and three smaller sub-area commands
(Naples, Italy; Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines; and
New Orleans, Louisiana) . Additionally, offices, small
units, and representatives are located wherever sealift
traffic requires (over 50 other ports in 1982)
[Ref. 27 :p. 2]. Command manpower strength in 1984 is
approximately 9100 (1600 personnel ashore, 7500 personnel
afloat) [Ref. 28:p. 2]
.
2 . Sealift_ and_ Miss ion
Strategic sealift is the fastest growing segment of
the Navy budget, reflecting its importance to national
defense. The 1984 Navy budget for sealift (other than for
cargo shipment) was twice as much as in 1981 and 1982
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Figure 2-6 MSC Organizational Relationships
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Until 1979, MSC had been considered a peacetime
ocean transportation command which carried cargo primarily
for peacetime DOD logistic support. 13 if needed in a
contingency, sealift was assumed to be available
[Ref. 12:p. 37]. However, several eventsl4,15 in the
1970 's demonstrated the need for more adequate strategic
lift capabilities. Today, the emphasis is clearly on
strategic sealift.
As a result of the increased emphasis on sealift,
MSC's mission is "to provide the sealift capability to
deploy and sustain military forces anywhere in the world as
rapidly, and as long as operation requirements dictate, in
support of national security objectives" [Ref. 28:p. 1].
Basically, this mission emphasizes strategic mobility and
contingency sealift as MSC's primary mission, whereas
formerly, the emphasis was on peacetime sealift.
MSC has five responsibilities:
a. to provide contingency and mobilization sealift
support to military forces world-wide.
b. to provide peacetime logistical sealift support to
military forces world-wide.
c. to develop plans and capabilities for emergency
expansion.
d. to operate fleet auxiliary force ships for the U.S.
Navy in both peace and war.
e. to provide and operate ships for special transpor-
tation purposes (primarily scientific support)
.
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These responsibilities demand a capability and
capacity to deploy and sustain military forces whenever and
wherever needed, as rapidly and as long as operational
requirements dictate. MSC ship groups (described in the
following section) carrying out the strategic sealift
mission are the Strategic Sealift (STRAT) ships, Naval Fleet
Auxiliary Force (NFAF) , and Special Mission Support (SMS)
ships. MSC peacetime operations include the movement of DOD
cargo, providing direct support to the Navy combatant fleet
or special mission support, maintaining afloat
prepositioning forces on station, and participating in
strategic mobility exercises. All of these operations
contribute directly to maintain readiness for the primary
mission. In addition to the three ship groups above, a
fourth ship group, the Miscellaneous Service Support (MSS)
ships carry out the peacetime role. [Ref. lltpp. 1-3]
3 . Ships
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Common User Ocean Transportation (CUOT)
Prepositioning Force (PPF)
Near Term Prepositioning Force (NTPF)
Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS)
Fast Sealift Support (FSS)
Ready Reserve Force (RRF) 17
Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force (NFAF)
Special Mission Support (SMS)
Miscellaneous Service Support (MSS)
As seen above and in Figures 2-7 and 2-8, ships in
the MSC Fleet fall into one of four functional ship groups:
STRATT, NFAF, SMS, or MSS. The STRAT ship group is composed
of three sub-groups: CUOT, PPF, and RRF. In turn, the PPF
is further divided into: NTPF, MPS, FSS, and RRF. [Ref. 2]
Each of the four ship groups (and sub-groups) is
described below. The order of discussion follows the order
of the ships given above.
a. Strategic Sealift (STRAT) Ships
STRAT ships are sponsored by OP-42 . Almost all
are manned with contract-operated civil (commercial)
merchant marine crews and, except where indicated, have no
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Ships by Assignment: USNS Chartered "
41 CUOT 17 CUOT 24 CUOT
17 NTPF 3 NTPF 14 NTPF
(13) MPS - (13) MPS




Active and Reserve USNS: 24 Ships
Total USNS (28 Ships
Active and Reserve Charters
:
Total Charters
Reserve Ships MARAD Asset
(Commercially Operated)
TOTAL non-USNS Ships












Figure 2-9. MSC Strategic Sealift Ship Group [Ref. 2]
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NOTES: 1. As of 19 October 1984,




Inactive ships are currently undergoing new
construction/conversion.
4. Includes government owned ships and bare boat
charters. See Appendix A.
5. Chartered less bare boat charters. See Appendices
A and B.
6. Ships are MARAD owned except for four ships which
are Navy owned, MSC assets in MARAD custody.
When activated (and under MSC ' s control), ships
are commercially operated except for seven ships
which are operated under the General Agency
Agreement (GAA) . See Appendix A.
7. Plus activated RRF ships.
Figure 2-9 (Continued)
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a. Common User Ocean Transportation (CUOT) : CUOT
consists of 16 common user dry cargo ships and 25
tankers. Normally providing point-to-point service
for DOD logistic requirements, these ships are
assigned to strategic sealift requirements when
needed. Ships are either under time charter to KSC,
bareboat chartered,!** or government owned. CUOT
ships are under operational and administrative control
of MSC.
b. Prepositioning Force (PPF) : The PPF provides afloat
maritime prepositioning and fast sealift. The PPF is
under operational and administrative control of MSC.
PPF is composed of:
(1) Near Term Prepositioning Force (NTPF) . Since
1980, the NTPF has been deployed in the Indian
Ocean (Diego Garcia) to provide maritime pre-
positioning. Essentially, 17 ships are mobile
storage depots with a 12-hour underway require-
ment. Loaded with equipment, munitions, fuel,
and water for the Rapid Deployment Force, their
location is near potential trouble areas. The
NTPF fills the short-term need for maritime pre-
positioning. In the 1985-1986 timeframe, the NTPF
will be replaced by MPS ships [Ref . 3 0:p. 739]
.
All ships in the NTPF are chartered or bareboat
chartered ships. A small military staff is aboard
the flag ship. Additionally, three ships carry
Navy communications vans.
(2) Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS) . Thirteen MPS
ships will be divided into three squadrons of
four, four, and five ships to provide the
permanent maritime prepositioning afloat in
different locations around the world. Each
squadron will have a flag ship with a small Navy
staff and detachment, and secure communication
capability. A second ship will be designated and
equipped as the alternate flag ship [Ref. 31].
Two ships have been delivered; 11 are being built
or converted to roll-on/roll-off (RORO)
capability. After delivery, the MPS ships will be
under long-term charter to MSC. With a stern
loading ramp and lighterage for over-the-beach
operations, an MPS can unload cargo across the
shore in up to 50-knot winds and 3-knot currents.
In this way, all cargo can be discharged within
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five days. Using a pier, all vehicles can be
unloaded within 12 hours, and all cargo within 72
hours. [Ref. 29:p. 38]
(3) Fast Sealift Support (FSS) ships. The FSS ships
provide rapid-response sealift capability. At
33-knots, they are the fastest ships in the U.S.
Merchant Marine. Sailing time is approximately
five days to Europe or two weeks to the Persian
Gulf via the Suez Canal. Of eight ships, four
have been delivered, and four are undergoing
conversion to combination RORO/container ships.
The majority of cargo to support one Army
mechanized or armored division can be loaded or
offloaded in a single day. [Ref. ll:p. 5] The
FSS ships will be anchored in a reduced operating
status (ROS) in coastal ports near the equipment
they will lift. FSS ships will be underway fully
loaded in five days (ROS 5) when directed.
[Ref. 27 :p. 9] FSS's are government owned and
charter operated. FSS ships do not have secure
communications capability. However, a military
detachment is on board during deployment to
accompany super-cargo. [Ref. 32]
c. Ready Reserve Force (RRF) : The RRF consists of 47
ships which are owned by the Maritime Administration
(MARAD) .19 in three locations, they are a reserve
status with a reduced operational status (ROS) of
either ROS 5 days or ROS 5 to 10 days. When
activated, an RRF ship is under operational control of
MSC. A program is underway to upgrade the
capabilities of the RRF [Ref. 33].
b. Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force (NFAF)
NFAF ships provide direct logistic support to
Navy fleet ships at sea. They are Navy owned and are
registered naval vessels. The NFAF ships are part of the
Navy's total Mobile Logistics Support Force (MLSF) . They
are assigned to either the Atlantic Fleet or Pacific Fleet
for operational control, and are sponsored by OP-03.
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Administrative control is by MSC. The ships are manned and
operated by MSC Civil Service (Government) Merchant Mariners
(MSC/CIVMAR) . Additionally, NFAF ships have a small
military contingent on board. Currently, 28 NFAF ships
(plus nine ships being constructed) are carried in the MSC
fleet inventory.
c. Special Mission Support (SMS)
Twenty-three SMS ships provide special
transportation for their sponsors. 20 In support of
special needs (primarily scientific research, cable laying
and repair, missile tracking, and surveillance) of DOD
agencies. They are like NFAF ships in terms of ownership,
manning, and naval registration. Operational and
administrative control is by MSC. Most ships have a small
military contingent on board. If SMS assets were required,
for example, in a contingency or strategic sealift
requirement, for all practical purposes the SMS ships 1
normal operations would cease, and the crews would be
reassigned to perform the required strategic sealift mission
[Ref . ll:p. 3]
.
d. Miscellaneous Service Support (MSS) ships
The 25 ships and service craft in the MSS
provide various types of support (such as fuel and coal
delivery, downrange support, scuba diving platforms, tug
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boat, target towing, and boat services) to various DOD
sponsors. 21 Except for four Navy owned pusher boats
which provide boat service to the NTPF in Diego Garcia, all
MSS ships are either time or voyage22 chartered.
Operational and administrative control is by MSC. Manning
is by civil (commercial) merchant mariners and no military
contingents are on board. Vessels and boats in the MSS are
not considered suitable for strategic sealift [Ref . 34]
.
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FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER II
^Program Manager (PM) is also referred to as System
Manager (SM)
.
7pMRT, Program Management Responsibility Transfer,
is the transition of overall program management
responsibilities from the implementating office, AFSC/JPO,
to the operational office, AFLC/JSSMO. The objective of
PRMT is to accomplish an orderly, timely, and efficient
transfer of program and functional responsibility. At PMRT,
certain inter-relationships and functional responsibilities
of the executive and supporting services change or become
effective. For the Navy, the major effect by PMRT is the
change for final approval authority from JPO to JSSMO. PMRT
occurs during Phase III. PMRT is scheduled to occur in
1987. [Ref. 17:pp. 33,38,44]
^Changes beyond the scope of the JCCB's authority
require approval from the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) (for example, for changes to the program's mission
element or program cost) or approval from the DOD component
(for example, changes to the flexible modular interface
(FMI) unit) [Ref. 17:p. 38],
9 It should be noted that OP-04 is not currently on
distribution for OP-943's letter [Ref. 15]. To be included
on distribution OP-04, identifies the need for military GPS
UE to OP-943 via the Office of Naval Warfare OP-95
,
specifically, the Force Level Plans Division, OP-950
[Ref. 5] .
l^In accordance with national security objectives,
MSC provides sealift capability to support the Unites
States' forward military strategy. This strategy uses
oceans as avenues to engage an enemy as far forward (away
from U.S. borders) as possible. It is heavily dependent on
the capability to project U.S. combat power overseas.
Successful deployment and sustainment of power, in turn, are
transportation dependent. Over 90 per cent of all combat
cargo to be moved must go by sea. [Ref. 25:p. 1]
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llNSCORG is a reserve-manned organization
responsible world-wide to fleet commanders for the routing
and control of allied merchant ships during mobilizations
and military contingencies [Ref. ll:p. 6].
12strategic sealift is afloat prepositioning and sea
movement of cargo in response to DOD strategic mobility and
logistic support requirements. Cargo includes material, POL
(petroleum, oil, and lubricants), and when requested,
passengers. [Ref. ll:p. 2]
^Actually, the value of prepositioning cargo and of
rapid deployment capability was realized prior to and during
the Vietnam War [Ref. 29:p. 37] . However, no organization
was willing to shoulder responsibility. Also, differing
perceptions prevailed. The end result was that MSC remained
a peacetime operation. For example, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS) , CNO, MSC commanders, and elements of Congress
had been advocating readiness aspects of sealift, but
opposing views were held by DOD's Office of Manpower,
Reserve Affairs, and Logistics (MRA&L) , and the House
Appropriations Committee who focused on peacetime needs,
economy, and efficiency. By 1981, the Navy finally accepted
its responsibility for sealift rather than viewing the
mission and MSC as competitors for Navy funds.
[Ref. 12:pp. 36-38]
14 Specif ically, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War required a
U.S. airlift. The 1974 Arab oil embargo, 1979 Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, and Soviet military buildup along
the Iranian border emphasized the vital importance of the
Persian Gulf. [Ref. 29:p. 37]
l 5The August 1979 Defense Guidance proposed
prepositioning supplies to increase responsiveness of forces
in rapid deployment. By January 1980, the Maritime
Prepositioning Ship (MPS) concept had been developed.
Meanwhile, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan dictated an
immediate need for an MPS-like capability in the Indian
Ocean. As a result, the first near term prepositioning
ships deployed for the Indian Ocean in July 1980. Expanding
a year later, the program became known as the Near Term
Prepositioning Force (NTPF) . [Ref. 29:p. 38] By
August 1982, the program had grown from the original seven
ships to seventeen ships.
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16 Ships in the MSC Fleet are categorized and
discussed either by: (a) functional group (which is used in
the MSC fleet inventory [Ref. 2] and in this thesis), or
(b) ship designation and ownership (information is provided
in Appendix A)
.
l 7The RRF is a Maritime Administration (MARAD)
asset. When activated, a ship is under control of MSC.
l 8 See Appendix B for types of charters.
19a few (e.g., two to four) ships, ex-USNS ships,
are Navy owned (MSC asset) in MARAD's custody [Ref. 2].
20 Sponsors include NAVOCEANCOM, NAVELEXSYSCOM,
NAVSEA, ESMC, LANTFLT, and DIRSSP [Ref. 2].
21various DOD components which are sponsors include
NAVSUP, Pacific Missile Test Center, Naval Civil Engineering
Lab, NOSC, NORDA, DOD, DOE, NAVLOGPAC, TRALANT, the David
Taylor Naval Ship Research and Development Center (DTNSRDC)
,
and MSC [Ref. 2]
.
22see Appendix B for types of charters.
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III. GP S_ SYSTEM.DESCRIPT 10N_ AND_ USER_ EQU IPMENT_
_£ UEl
Like LORAN and TRANSIT, GPS is being developed as a
military navigation system. However, unlike earlier systems
such as TRANSIT which was kept highly classified until well
after the system became operational, Global Positioning
System (GPS) aspects and applications are being openly and
actively discussed by civil as well as military communities.
[Ref. 35 :p. 2] 23 The operational GPS will provide two
navigation services: the precise positioning service (PPS)
and the standard positioning service (SPS) .^4
Horizontal predictable and repeatable accuracy is
approximately 18.1 meters (2 drms 25 ), currently 100
meters (2 drms) for PPS and SPS respectively. Horizontal
relative accuracy is 10 meters (2 drms) for both PPS and
SPS. [Refs. 9:p. 34;36:p. 22]
A. GPS SEGMENTS
GPS consists of three major segments: the space
segment, control segment, and user equipment segment. The
space segment is used by both military and civilian users.
Each community uses its own user equipment.
The space segment includes a navigation package and an
integrated operational nuclear detonation detection system.
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When fully operational, this segment consists of eighteen
satellites^ (plus spares) in six circular orbits 10,898
nautical miles above earth. The high altitude and precise
satellite spacing is such that a minimum of four satellites
will always be in view to the user, thereby ensuring
continuous world-wide coverage without distortion. During
Phase III, production satellites will be launched from the
space shuttle. The projected launch schedule will produce a
twelve satellite constellation by the end of 1987. Full GPS
operation, with an eighteen satellite constellation, is
scheduled for 1989 [Ref. 37:p. 45].
The control segment consists of a master control
station, ground control and antenna stations, monitor
stations, and an alternate control center. The control
segment maintains control and accuracy of the satellite
network. While passively tracking satellites in view, the
control segment collects orbit and ranging data. The
information is then processed, updated, and uploaded back to
the satellites. [Ref. 39:p. 2] Initial availability of the
operational control segment is scheduled for January 1985.
Full operation is scheduled in 1987. [Ref. 5]
The user segment consists of user equipment (UE) . GPS
UE is designed to first acquire satellites, and then receive
and process data from four satellites either sequentially or
simultaneously. After acquiring the satellites, the UE
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measures the relative delays between two frequencies
transmitted from each satellite. This allows computation of
signal delay. Then, using navigation signals from each of
four satellites, the UE (specifically the RPU) measures four
independent pseudorange rates with respect to the
satellites. The UE then converts this information, which is
the user's velocity and range with respect to each
satellite, into three-dimensional position, velocity, and
system time.
Because the position solution is referenced to a common
grid, the World Geodetic System 1972 (WGS-72) , civil and
military position data can be standardized on a world-wide
basis. UE can transform navigation information into other
commonly used datums as well. [Ref. 40 :p. 4] Military and
commercial GPS UE are described below.
B. MILITARY GPS UE
The capability feature of military GPS UE is
accessibility to both levels of accuracy, PPS and SPS,
provided by the operational GPS satellites.
Military GPS UE is designed for maximum commonality and
interchangeability at the module level. The use of common
modules or components is consistent with the overall GPS
program strategy to reduce life cycle cost while satisfying
a large range of host vehicles having various navigation
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requirements and operating dynamics. A military user
equipment set is an appropriate combination of four major
components: the antenna, receiver processor unit (RPU)
,
flexible modular interface (FMI) unit, and control display
unit (CDU) . (Appendix C describes military GPS UE set
components.) While not part of the UE set per se, hardware
such as racks and cabling complete the items which would be
installed. Each component or line replaceable unit (LRU) is
designed for use on multiple host platforms. The
integration of military GPS UE on Navy platforms v/ill be
achieved by selecting the appropriate combination of LRUs
necessary to meet individual platform requirements.
[Ref. 39:p. 8]
UE sets are designed for usage in a wide variety of host
vehicles. Three types of UE sets, distinguished by the type
of RPU used, have been developed and can be classified as
Low Dynamic (LD) , Medium Dynamic (MD) , and High Dynamic (HD)
sets. While the RPU is the same for each set type (e.g.,
the same RPU is used in all two-channel MD sets) , other LRU
elements can be substituted to meet specific host
requirements.
The one-channel LD set is intended for men (e.g., foot
soldiers) and vehicles (e.g., jeeps, tanks, riverine
vehicles) . The two-channel MD set is intended for surface
ships, helicopters, and medium performance aircraft (e.g.,
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reconnaissance, transport and tanker aircraft) . The five-
channel HD set is intended for submarine (SSN/SSBN) and high
performance aircraft (e.g., attack, fighter, and strategic
aircraft) . This set will normally be used in a vehicle
operating in a high dynamic and/or high jamming environment,
or in a vehicle where fast acquisition of GPS signals is
required. While the GPS UE set types are intended for the
vehicles just described, specific host requirements and
utilization dictate the GPS UE set and design to be
provided. [Ref. 18:pp. 26,27] UE set performance and
physical characteristics, navigation modes, operating
states, and design features are summarized concisely in
Reference 18 on pages 32-43 and 52-53. UE set environmental
design, maintenance support concept, reliability and
maintainability, and UE set interface are discussed in
Reference 18 on pages 54-63.
In addition to component part commonality, military GPS
UE is designed to provide worst-case capability in terms of
use, environment and exposure to threat. Primary hostile
environment threats include jamming, spoofing,
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) bursts, and nuclear events.
While some degree of hardening and shielding is incorporated
in all military GPS UE, the degree to which the host vehicle
is likely to require protection determines how much
protection is provided.
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C. COMMERCIAL GPS UE
While development of commercial GPS UE is outside the
scope of DOD joint program development for GPS space,
control, and military UE segments, DOD does determine the
accuracy capability which will be available to civil users
of GPS. Four DOD policy issues are applicable and important
to navigators using commercial GPS UE. The policy issues
are PPS access, SPS accuracy, SPS availability, and user
charges.
DOD plans to restrict access to PPS by encrypting the
P-code signal, which provides PPS accuracy, transmitted by
the production satellites. PPS, intended primarily for
military application, will be available to civil users only
on an approved case-by-case basis and only if the user can
provide security. Current plans are for a cryptographic
device to control access to PPS. [Ref. 8:p. 103] However,
what is to be protected, and how much security is to be
provided, have yet to be determined at this writing
[Ref. 16]
.
The second policy is that SPS will be continuously
available at the highest level of accuracy consistent with
U.S. national security interests [Ref. 9:p. 62]. To date
DOD has established this level at a degraded SPS accuracy of
100 meters (2 drms) for civil users when GPS is operational.
However, it is envisioned that the permitted SPS accuracy of
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100 meters is likely to improve, eventually providing accur-
acies approaching 20-40 meters (2 drms) . [Ref. 41:p. 187]
The third issue is the availability of SPS accuracy. If
required, DOD can selectively degrade SPS accuracy to worse
than 100 meters.
And finally, the fourth issue is that of user charges.
The U.S. Congress has directed that GPS be made available on
a user charge basis. Tentative annual charges are $375 for
SPS and $3700 for PPS. However, there has been strong
opposition from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
.
Also, DOD would like to avoid the administrative and
technical complication of user charges. Therefore, most
observers predict that user charges will never be
implemented. [Ref. 42:p. 4]
In view of the above, commercial GPS UE will be
developed to receive and/or process either only the SPS
accuracy level, or both the PPS and SPS accuracy levels
[Ref. 42:p. 3]. Although specific commercial GPS UE
configuration is not now available for general purpose GPS
use, it will be comparable to military GPS UE. That is,
generically, commercial and military GPS UE will be the same
and consist of an antenna, RPU, CDU, etc., plus cables and
rack mounts. What will be available in terms of design
characteristics for commercial GPS UE can be described
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generally in terms of navigation equipment currently
available.
Currently, commercial satellite navigation UE is
designed to meet the needs and desires of the commercial
market. A key feature is that technology improvements are
quickly incorporated. Consequently, periodic product
improvements result in equipment which is technologically
current. With costs dictating inexpensive design and
production when possible, and competition forcing production
of reliable and effective equipment, commercial GPS UE,
which will become available, is anticipated to be highly
competitive, inexpensively produced, and varied to meet a
wide use of applications in the civil sector. Additionally,
to attract a broad spectrum of civil users, GPS UE will need
to be priced low enough to compete with existing satellite
navigation systems until the latter are phased-out. Unless
a company is producing equipment for DOD use, meeting full
DOD mil-specs for DOD commonality and hardening will not be
design features of commercial GPS UE. 27 [Ref. 43]
D. MARKET STATUS
Commercial GPS UE for general purpose marine navigation
is not currently a marketable product because the full
production satellite constellation is not yet available.
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Further, general purpose GPS UE is not available to this
type of user (e.g., a cargo ship, whose operation is
point-to-point navigation, as opposed to the user requiring
precision positioning, such as in geodetic survey) because
the return on investment is not yet adequate for companies
to produce and then sell commercial GPS UE. [Ref. 45]
While there is a market of potential users, the key
reason is that the current GPS prototype satellite
constellation, while allowing access to full accuracy28
of both PPS and SPS, is limited to only a few hours a day of
full GPS coverage in most parts of the world. When compared
to TRANSIT, today's limited availability (but superior
accuracy) of GPS is similar to OMEGA'S often degraded and
error-prone accuracy (but continuous availability) . The
shipping world prefers TRANSIT, and has almost forgotten
OMEGA unless it is used with TRANSIT. Even though TRANSIT
is periodic and its accuracy is less than OMEGA' s potential
accuracy, TRANSIT is more reliable than OMEGA, and it is
better than celestial navigation. [Ref. 45]
Another reason is that DOD policy is still being
developed such as the capability to be allowed to
commercial users in terms of GPS accuracy and availability.
For instance, SPS accuracy had been stated at 50 meters;
however, it is now 100 meters [Ref. 36:p. 22]. Further,
while approval for DSARC III is fully expected, the final
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mix of navigation systems still needs to be determined
regarding what systems will be available and until how long.
For example, until 1984 completion of TRANSIT phase-out was
scheduled for 1992 [Refs. 9:p. 44;8]; now it is scheduled
for 1994 [Ref. 7]. One company, for the purposes of market
planning, expects TRANSIT to be available until the year
2000. Nevertheless, participation on the part of the
civilian communities is having an impact on government
planning. The National Ocean Industries Association (NOIA)
,
for instance, strongly advocates that PPS accuracy is
required for vital commercial industries. [Ref. 46] And as
a result of the South Korean commercial airline which was
shot down in 1983, a Congressional concurrent resolution was
passed for government planning to expedite use of GPS for
civil aviation [Ref. 47:p. 4].
It is apparent that commercial GPS UE producers will
take advantage of military GPS UE developments. Commercial
companies are conducting market research. Those that have
been or are involved with government GPS, such as Magnavox,
Rockwell-Collins, and Texas Instruments, are competitively
developing their own commercial GPS UE. These companies
already have made a substantially large investment in
research, development, and resources (equipment, time and
personnel). They are already in a position to produce their
own commercial GPS UE, dependent on U.S. government GPS
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developments [Ref. 43], and will have an advantage over
newcomers.
Also, even in its current state, GPS has near-term use
in fields such as hydrographic research and geodetic survey,
where immediate cost savings can be realized with the
present research and development (R&D) satellite
constellation [Ref. 42:p. 4]. Texas Instruments has
produced and made available the first commercial GPS UE set,
the TI-4100. The TI-4100 is for precise marine positioning
as opposed, for example, to transocean general marine
navigation. The four TI-4100 models and associated antenna
cable range from $139,800 to $145,550, with a cassette
transporter at $17,800 and accessories (rack mounts or
carrying case) from $875 to $1660 [Ref. 48] . This equipment
enables the use of current R&D satellite structure; however,
its use is primarily for hydrographic and specialized
applications such as offshore oil rig positioning. In this
use precise positioning is required as opposed to
positioning requirements needed for general marine
navigation. It should be noted that for geophysical marine
work, such as in positioning an offshore oil rig, the time
and fuel saved is more obvious. Texas Instruments, in
marketing their currently commercially available GPS UE,
makes this specific point: if the customer has an offshore
oil rig that needs to be positioned at exactly the same
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coordinates the explorers have noted, hitting the correct
position "is so critical that missing it by as little as ten
meters might mean failure. .. [the customer would] .. .spend as
much time measuring and maneuvering as necessary -- even if
it meant spending four days at sea getting it right."
[Ref. 49:p. 3] While necessary, that amount of time would
cost the customer "...the price of several TI GPS units any
of which could pinpoint the location in minutes."
[Ref. 49:p. 3]
In another application, a cost study completed by the
U.S. Naval Oceanographic Office (NAVOCEANO) showed that
$3,000,000 in annual operating costs 29 could be saved
for two hydrographic ships and their associated survey
launches, by purchasing fourteen geodetic receivers called
GEOSTAR. GEOSTAR's are modified Texas Instruments TI-4100
GPS receivers being developed under a government research
contract [Ref. 50:pp. 81-82]
.
However, other companies, such as Navidyne (which is not
involved in government GPS UE R&D)
,
plan to observe GPS and
government developments before investing to produce GPS UE
.
Navidyne feels that widespread commercial GPS UE will be
available about one year after the entire GPS constellation
is in place and fully operating. Then companies having the
ability to produce low priced equipment should be able to
provide commercial GPS UE. "It will be a fine product in
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the 1990 's, n said one Navidyne official, "the market place
will take off on its own." [Ref. 45]
On the other hand, companies which have had or are
working on government contracts can be expected to provide
commercial GPS UE somewhat earlier. Since they have already
made a substantial investment in research, development, and
resources, these companies will be in a position to get a
jump on newcomers.
While specific information is not available, 30
Magnavox is developing a variety of commercial GPS UE sets
as well as a modification unit to retrofit currently
existing MZ-1100 series navigation receivers [Ref. 43].
Rockwell-Collins, on the other hand, plans to produce GPS
products to be combined with components produced by other
companies (such as Navidyne) as opposed to directly
supplying end users [Refs. 46;51].
The primary feature for the commercial GPS UE market
will be in product differentiation, with low price being the
most important factor to assure widespread commercial use of
GPS UE.
Even though it is too early to make commitments for
production schedules and prices for commercial GPS UE which
will be available when the satellite system is operational,
Magnavox predicts that prices will be very reasonable.
Competent commercial GPS UE will be available at prices of
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$500 or less before the year 2000 [Ref. 42:p. 5]. It is too
early to predict prices, but the trend is obvious. Due to
technological improvements and competition, the price of
sophisticated electronic devices continues to decline. This
trend exists in mature products such as color TV sets built
in large volume and in calculators. For example, the author
experienced that a hand-held calculator (Texas Instruments)
that sold for $69 in 1974 dropped to under $10 by 1983. The
trend is even more dramatic for less mature, more
sophisticated instruments such as satellite navigation
equipment. For example, the price trend for Magnavox
equipment from mid-1976 until 1982 was downward at 28 per
cent per year. A model produced in 1982 fell below that
curve. [Ref. 20:p. 1188] There is no reason to believe that
the price trend for civil GPS UE products will be any
different [Ref. 42:p. 6].
In order to attract a large number of civil users, the
price of GPS UE which does become available when GPS becomes
operational will need to be low enough so that many users
will be able to purchase the equipment. Additionally, GPS
UE must be competitive with radionavigation systems
currently in use, particularly with TRANSIT user equipment.
A key determinant in prices is the quantity that
manufacturers will produce. [Ref. 52:p. 15]
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Simplicity of operation is a second factor in assuring
wide civil use of GPS UE. Simple GPS UE operation, however,
is solved by GPS itself for the civil as well as military
communities. The awkward and unfriendly characteristics of
the existing r adionavigation systems will not be problems
with the GPS. For instance, GPS will eliminate problems of
periodic fixes and proper initialization (both TRANSIT
disadvantages) , calibration requirements and adjustment of
notch filters (both LORAN-C disadvantages), and fear of
erroneous data (OMEGA). [Ref. 20:p. 1188]
Finally the third factor is competition. Every
indication is that a very large number of companies
world-wide are planning to enter the GPS UE market in the
short run. Intense international competition will result in
lower prices and improved performance for the users. Then,
when the competitive pressure becomes too intense and* prof it
margins shrink or disappear, many companies will leave the
market, leaving a more stabilized group of producers.
[Ref. 42:p. 6]
As time passes, commercial GPS UE can be expected to
become more flexible, lightweight, compact, easy to use,
reliable, and technologically current. To the extent that
mil-specs do not force use of obsolete components, these
features can also be expected in military GPS UE. The
commonality design for military GPS UE should help toward
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this end. Additionally, prices are expected to continue
dropping, allowing better government buys, and even better
government lot buys. This is certainly true for commercial
GPS UE. It is also true for military GPS UE; however, it is
constrained by the additional cost of mil-specs, and by the
probability of these specifications forcing the use of
obsolete LRUs.
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FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER III
23fot example, the Institute of Navigation is
sponsoring a seminar, "National Technical Meeting" in
January 1985. And, the International Association of Geodesy
jointly with the International Union of Geodesy and
Geophysics, DOD, DMA, U.S. Department of Commerce, and
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) are
sponsoring the "First International Symposium on Precise
Positioning with the Global Positioning System, Positioning
with GPS - 1985" in April 1985.
24pps and SPS are from satellite signals P-code and
C/A code respectively. See footnote 26.
25"drms" is deviation (distance) root mean square
(radial error)
.
26Each satellite broadcasts a composite signal on
two L-band frequencies to correct for ionospheric refraction
effects. The two frequencies are called L-, (1575.42
MHZ) and L~ (1277.6 MHZ). Two types of signals will be
carried: a precise (P) signal, also called P-code, is a
"pseudorandom" sequence of ones and zeros with a switching
rate of 10.23 MHZ (the P-codes are so long they repeat every
seven days), and a clear acquisition C/A signal, also called
C/A code, with a switch rate of 1.023 MHZ (the C/A code
repeats every millisecond, e.g., the codes are 1023 bits
long) [Ref. 38:p. 5]. L-, wm carry both the (P) and
(C/A) signal. L
2 win carry either the (P) or (C/A)
signal. Superimposed on these signals will be navigational
and system data including satellite ephemeris, atmospheric
propagation correction data, and satellite clock bias
information [Ref. 18:p. 2].
2
'However, when designing their commercial




28 It should be noted that currently both PPS and SPS
are available. As stated earlier in this chapter, DOD plans
for limiting access are applicable to the operational GPS
using production satellites.
2^Annual cost savings were in support unit costs,
helicopter support, equipment, and geodetic teams. More
efficient use of ships, reduction of minor costs due to a
smaller military personnel complement, and vehicle/small
boat support are not included in the $3,000,000 figure
[Ref . 50:p. 82]
.
30secause source selection for the government
contract to produce military GPS UE is currently in
progress, specific information and costs are extremely
competition sensitive and are proprietary information. The
contract is scheduled to be awarded in early CY 1985.
Magnavox and Rockwell-Collins are the competing companies.
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IV . CURRENT_ STATUS. 0F_ MSC_ AS_ A_ USER
A. CURRENT RADIONAVIGATION SYSTEMS USED
Above all, the Master is responsible for the safety of
his ship. Military Sealift Command (MSC) policy is that the
meeting of schedules are to be considered desirable targets;
they are not to "...be met by accepting undue_risks of
collision with other ships, heavy weather or ice damage, or
otherwise violating the principle that the safety of the
ship is paramount to all other considerations."
[Ref. 53:Section 1-5-8 p. l-39d] A key part of this policy
is that the Master is responsible for the safe navigation of
his ship. 3! This is fundamentally a straightforward
task, which a few years ago was effectively accomplished by
celestial navigation and prudence. 32 Successful
navigation then as now, is the direct result of the accuracy
of the fix. [Ref. 54:p. 137]
Of the radionavigation systems used currently, MSC ships
use LORAN-C, TRANSIT, and OMEGA. MSC's need for good
navigation equipment is reflected in the proforma portion of
both tanker and dry cargo charters. Currently, LORAN-C and
a satellite navigation (SATNAV) system are required;
however, MSC charters do not specify a particular SATNAV
system. [Ref. 55] However, today the two systems available
and in use by the civilian sector for ocean navigation are
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TRANSIT and OMEGA [Ref. 9:pp. 18,19]. Of the two, TRANSIT
is the standard SATNAV used for sea-going vessels
[Ref. 56:p. 24] .
While each system has advantages, each also has major
limitations. The following are brief comments on major
limitations of the systems used in MSC ships:
a. LOPAN-C: Coverage is limited to U.S. coast,
Continental U.S., and selected overseas areas
(approximately 10 per cent of earth) [Ref. 40:p. 1].
Useful range is 1000 nautical miles because the
stations are land-based. LORAN-C is limited by
skywave interference. While good for coastal
navigation, the major constraint is that coverage is
limited to localized areas [Ref. 9:p. 25].
b. OMEGA: System is subject to multipath errors
[Ref. 40:p. 1], While coverage is continuous and the
range of operation is nearly world-wide (essentially
88 per cent global coverage by day and 98 per cent by
night [Ref. 57 :p. 13]), OMEGA is limited in accuracy
due to propagation effects and restrictions on using
signals when close to a station. For these reasons,
the system does not meet the accuracy requirements
(when used alone) for maritime navigation in U.S.
coastal areas [Ref. 9:p. 30].
c. TRANSIT: Coverage is periodic versus continuous. The
interval betv/een fixes is about 90 minutes (30 minutes
at 80° latitude, 110 minutes at the Equator)
.
While the system provides world-wide coverage (except
at the poles) , and accurate positions for fixed and
low dynamic (slow moving) vehicles, the primary user
limitation is that positional fixes are not
continuous. Dead reckoning (DR) is required between
fixes. 33 ' 34 [Ref. 9:pp. 44-45]
For additional information concerning navigation
systems, readers may refer to Reference 58, pages 6-11,
18-26, and 32-37.
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Currently, approximately 70 per cent to 75 per cent of
the TRANSIT receivers that MSC purchases commercially are
Navidyne receivers, and 25 per cent to 30 per cent are
Magnavox receivers [Refs. 59;60] . "Both are good," said one
MSC staff member, "...but I can get you four Navidynes for
the price of one Magnavox. 35 with Magnavox, you pay a
lot for quality, reliability, and high MTBM36 — 3500
hours [MTBM] for the [Magnavox model] 1157, ... We just
bought a Magnavox system for about $50,000, ... We don't
have maintenance problems. Occasionally, we'll replace the
antenna. It takes about 45 minutes." [Ref. 61] The price
of another system recently purchased by MSC, the Mark II
from INTECH, was $12,000 for the SATNAV and $22,000 37
for the system. INTECH products were estimated to be
approximately 40 to 45 per cent of the cost of Magnavox
products [Ref. 62] . Since the MSC ship which is to receive
the INTECH navigation system already has the hardware (e.g.,
cabling) and foundations in place, an estimated worst-case
installation cost would be approximately $2,000. [Ref. 62]
B. COMPARISON OF MSC AND THE MILITARY GPS UE INSTALLATION
SCHEDULE
Three primary sources were used in determining MSC ship
installation schedules for military GPS UE : (1) the MSC
Fleet Inventory [Ref. 2]; (2) the MSC new ship construction/
conversion program [Ref. 3]; and (3) the GPS UE Installation
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Schedule, POM- 86 Decision Package [Ref. 1], hereafter called
POM- 86
.
POM-86 identifies Navy platforms to receive military GPS
UE f and provides a schedule for UE procurement and
installation. The Joint Program Office (JPO) has approved
funding and installation of military GPS UE on vehicles
listed in POM-86. Currently in the planning, programming,
budgeting (PPBS) process, POM-86 should receive
Congressional obligational authority in October 1985.
Assuming this is forthcoming, and that funding and the
schedule are approved, JPO will procure military GPS UE
starting in 1986. The first installations in POM-86 are
scheduled in 1987.
References 2 and 3 were used to construct a
summary38 of MSC ships against which POM-86 was
compared. As described in Chapter II, each ship belongs to
one of four functional categories:
a. Strategic Sealift (STRAT)
b. Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force (NFAF)
c. Special Mission Support (SMS)
d. Miscellaneous Service Support (MSS)
Fifty-six ships undergoing (or projected to undergo)
construction or conversion [Ref. 3]39'40 were also
considered since they too affect the total number of GPS UE
sets required. Ships planned for conversion originate
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either from resources outside the MSC Fleet (e.g., private
industry), or from within the MSC Fleet (e.g., conversion of
USNS Hayes to another class type) . Ultimately, newly
constructed or converted ships, when added to the MSC Fleet
Inventory, will either be outright additions to the MSC
fleet or replace existing vessels. The constructed summary
allowed direct comparison between MSC ships and the POM-86
schedule.
For the purpose of this thesis, ships scheduled to be
replaced or retired were not included in the constructed
summary of MSC ships used for comparison with POM-86.
However, it should be noted that if replaced vessels remain
in service after 1994 (TRANSIT phase-out period end in
1994) , then they should also be considered for GPS UE.
1 • Ships_ Scheduled_fpr_ Military. GPS_UE_i Included. in
POM=861
POM-86 provides 58 military GPS UE sets for MSC
ships with 41 units for Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force (NFAF)
ships and 17 units for Special Mission Support (SMS) ships.
For MSC ships included in POM-86, procurement of military
GPS UE will be made from 1988 through 1992. A two year
period for production and delivery is anticipated.
Following delivery, two years are allowed to install the
equipment. MSC ship installations are scheduled from 1990
through 1994. Some NFAF ships under construction may not
meet the installation time period as discussed below.
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a. NFAF Ships
Figure 4-1 is a comparison between the
constructed summary of MSC NFAF ships and general POM-86
information. Ship requirements are for 44 GPS UE sets.
Forty-one military GPS UE sets are scheduled, leaving a
shortfall of three GPS UE sets. An update to POM-86 for one
ship has been submitted [Ref . 66] . Approval to the update
will result in new shortfalls (two T-AK/FBM's, fleet
ballistic missile resupply ships) for military GPS UE.
Except for the T-AK/FBM's, NFAF ships were considered as
platform candidates for military GPS UE early in 1982
[Ref. 39:p. 7]
.
The installation schedule, allowing for the year
assigned in POM-86 plus two years for installation, will
enable the nine new construction T-AGOS's (T-AGOS #4 through
#12), and thirteen new construction T-AO's (T-AO #187
through #199) , to be built before GPS UE is scheduled for
installation in POM-86. Whether the POM-86 installation
schedule enables GPS UE installation on six additional new
construction T-AGOS's (T-AGOS #13 through T-AGOS #18),
depends on the progress of ship construction and delivery of
the ship. If the ships are delivered as planned, or are far
enough into construction that GPS UE can be installed prior
to the end of 1992 (the end of the required two-year
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Figure 4-1 Comparison Between NFAF Constructed Summary
and POM-86 for Military GPS UE [Refs. 2;3;63;66]
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installation. On the other hand, if the T-AGOS construction
schedule slips, the last ship may not be available until
after the required installation time period. However, with
a delivery schedule for T-AGOS #13 through T-AGOS #18
similar to that for the earlier T-AGOS' s (deliveries at 2.5
month intervals [Ref. 67]), the POM-86 schedule will meet
the delivery schedule. (The delivery schedule calls for
delivery of the eighteenth T-AGOS in 1991 [Ref. 3].)
POM-86 calls for installation of all eighteen
GPS UE sets onto T-AGOS' s during the same interval, which is
approximately one ship installation per 1.3 months over a
two-year installation period. Unless operational
commitments indicate otherwise, this should not present a
problem.
NFAF ships, as noted in Chapter II, are
Navy-owned and are registered naval vessels. They are
assigned to either the Atlantic Fleet or Pacific Fleet for
operational control, and to MSC for administrative control.
NFAF ships provide direct support to the Navy fleet,
b. SMS Ships
Figure 4-2 is a comparison between the
constructed summary of MSC SMS ships and general POM-86
information. Ship requirements are for twenty GPS UE sets.
POM-86 schedules seventeen military GPS UE sets, leaving a
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.
c - Does not include USNS Bowditch (T-AGS 21) and
USNS Dutton (T-AGS 22) , which are to be replaced
by new construction T-AGS 39 and T-AGS 40.
d - Two T-AGM 's are scheduled to receive military
GPS UE in 1985. Third T-AGM is to be replaced.
Figure 4-2 Comparison Between SMS Constructed Summary
and POM-86 for Military GPS UE
[Refs. 2; 3; 63; 64; 65]
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the USNS Hayes, which is to be converted to T-AG 195, one is
USNS Mizar (T-AGOR) involved in oceanographic research, and
the third is USNS Furman (T-AK) , an undersea cable
transporter. The author did not determine whether sponsors
had submitted requests for military GPS UE. Except for the
T-AK, SMS ships were also considered as platform candidates
for military GPS UE in 1982 [Refs. 4:p. 7;39:p. 7].
The installation schedule, allowing for the year
assigned in POM-86 plus two years for installation, enables
completion of new construction/conversion ships before GPS
UE is installed.
SMS ships are like NFAF ships for ownership and
naval registration. Operation and administrative control is
by MSC (see Chapter II) . SMS ships require precise
positioning service (PPS) information due to the missions
they support.
c. Summary
Both NFAF and SMS ships were funded/scheduled in
POM-86. NFAF ships need military GPS UE because they
operate with battle forces. The need is taken care of
through the Fleet Modernization Program. SMS ships need
military GPS UE because of the missions they support.
[Ref. 66] Most SMS ships are involved in activities such as




In summary, of sixty-four NFAF and SMS ships in
the constructed summary, fifty-eight ships (approximately 91
per cent) are currently scheduled for military GPS UE. Of
six existing shortfalls, one NFAF (T-AFS) has been submitted
as an update to POM-86 for military GPS UE. The five
remaining shortfalls, if determined not to need military GPS
UE, will require commercial GPS UE by the end of the TRANSIT
phase-out period.
2 . Ships_Npt_ Scheduled. fpr_Military_GPS_UE_iNpt
Ineluded_ in_ P0M=861
Strategic Sealift (STRAT) ships and Miscellaneous
Service Support (MSS) ships comprise the bulk of the MSC
Fleet. As shown below, over half of the MSC Fleet is made
up of STRAT ships. Together the STRAT and MSS ships make up









STRAT 111 59.36 15 126
NFAF 28 14.97 9 37
SMS 23 12.30 - 23
MSS 25 13.37 - 25
TOTAL 187 100.0% 24 211
In terms of funding and planning for installation of
either military or commercial GPS UE for STRAT and MSS
ships, the author finds no special plans being made to date
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for STRAT or MSS ships. They were not included for military
GPS UE.
Although an interest for GPS has been expressed at
MSC commands, MSC personnel stated that no advanced planning
for MSC to be a candidate for GPS UE was known
[Refs. 59;68], as of July 1984, and that definitive planning
was not yet needed [Ref. 61] as of August 1984. Although
MSC could be a potential user, there are several reasons why
MSC is not currently involved [Ref. 68]: first, the GPS
operational satellite system does not function yet; second,
commercial equipment is not yet available; and third, DOD
policy issues (discussed in Chapter III) need to be
finalized. Additionally, one staff member [Ref. 61] felt
that TRANSIT would be available for another fifty years.
Several considerations make the STRAT and MSS ships
markedly different from NFAF and SMS ships. The first
difference is in ownership and manning. All NFAF and SMS
ships are government owned and government civil service
manned with DOD/MSC merchant mariners (MSC/CIVMARS) . In the
STRAT ships, 86 per cent of the CUOT and PPF ships (64
ships) are manned by civilian merchant mariners
[Ref. 2:pp. 4-8] . 41 Also, approximately 62 per cent of
the 64 ships are commercially owned and under charter to MSC
[Ref. 2:pp.4-8]. 42 In the MSS ship group, 84 per cent
of the ships are under charter (commercially owned) and also
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operated (manned) by civilian merchant mariners
[Ref. 2:p. 12] .43 Finally, almost all NFAF and SMS
ships have a small military detachment embarked (usually a
communications detachment) , whereas only a very few STRAT
ships have military personnel aboard (e.g., the NTPF
flagship and planned MPS flagships have/will have a military
contingent on board to provide secure communications
capability and to function as the flag staff)
.
The second difference between STRAT/MSS ships and
NFAF/SMS ships is that the emphasis on strategic sealift
(since late 1979's) [Ref. 12:p. 38], and the establishment
of overall MSC sponsorship at the OPNAV level (1984)
[Ref. 13] are recent developments as described in Chapters I
and II. An important concern is to insure that the MSC
Fleet is adequately prepared and equipped to meet the
primary mission. As a result, more ships are being added to
the MSC Fleet and ship enhancement programs have been
initiated.
The third difference is the 'visibility' and
employment of the ships (author's opinion). STRAT and MSS
ships traditionally were not too 'visible'. Even today,
during peacetime operations, they do not usually function
directly with operating forces (e.g., a point-to-point
tanker (CUOT) along the West Coast as compared to a fleet
oiler (NFAF)). However, as explained in Chapter I, there
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has been a tremendous effort and emphasis on sealift
support, strategic sealift, and maritime prepositioning.
a. STRAT Ships
Ships are assigned (see Chapter II) as either
Common User Ocean Transportation (CUOT) ships,
Prepositioning Force (PPF) ships, or as Ready Reserve Force
(RRF) ships. The PPF group is further divided into the Near
Term Positioned Force (NTPF) , the Maritime Prepositioning
Ship (MPS) ships, and the Fast Sealift Support (FSS)
ships. 44 The RRF, a Maritime Administration (MARAD)
asset, is in a reserve status with an Reduced Operational
Status (ROS) of either ROS 5 days or ROS 5 to 10 days. As
explained earlier, when activated, RRF ships are under
operational control of MSC.
In considering STRAT ships for future planning,
the NTPF will be replaced by the MPS ships [Ref. 29:p. 38].
Unless their charters are renewed, NTPF ships will be
returned to their owners (e.g., by the end of 1986) . The
proposed force structure of the Maritime Prepositioning
Program and support for the force, is to have thirteen
T-AKR's (MPS ships) deployed afloat in three task forces
plus the following support ships in ROS: eleven T-ACS's,




The 25 ships and service craft in the MSS are
under various charters and DOD component sponsorship. These
ships are not suitable for strategic sealift [Ref . 34] . The
services vary from carrying break bulk coal to providing
ferryboat service.
Some craft may not require any/any additional
navigation aid. For instance, the four pusher boats (the
only MSS ships and craft owned by the Navy and sponsored by
MSC) , are boats used for personnel and cargo transfer
between the NTPF ships and the shore. When not in use, the
pusher boats are stowed aboard NTPF ships. However, all the
vessels in this group should have their required navigation
needs considered.
c. Summary
Because of the emphasis on sealift support,
anticipated phase-out of TRANSIT, improvements which will be
available with the GPS method of navigation as opposed to
current methods of navigation, and the potential need of
good navigational aids on board the ships, STRAT and MSS
ships also need to be considered for GPS UE. The basic
decision required is whether they should receive military or
commercial GPS UE.
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FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER IV
3lThe only time the Master can legally transfer his
navigational responsibility (to the Pilot) is when
transiting the Panama Canal. [Ref. 53:Section 1-5-9,
page l-39d]
32it is recognized that navigation aids (such as
satellite navigation, gyroscopes, and radar) are not -and
cannot substitute for good judgement, basic seamanship,
strict compliance with the International Navigation Rules,
and an alert lookout. While they are extensions of the
navigator's vision and boons to navigation, they are only
aids. [Ref. 53:Section 1-5-8, page l-39c]
33Civil TRANSIT users far exceed DOD users. For
example, by the end of 1981 and 1982, the numbers of civil
users were 34,000 and 38,000 respectively, as compared to
the numbers of DOD users which were 405 and 460,
respectively. [Ref. 9:pp. 44-45]
-^Approximately 90 per cent of all commercial
receivers sold are single channel receivers [Ref. 58:
pp. 44-45]
.
35por example, government purchase price is $4462.50
and $21,241.00 for a Navidyne ESE-4000 and Magnavox MX-1102,
respectively [Refs. 44;51] . Here, the factor is
approximately 4.8.
3 6mtbM is mean time between maintenance.
37 System included TRANSIT, SATNAV, and components,
plus OMEGA, two satellite frequencies, printer, and 100
per cent spare parts [Ref. 62]
.
^Additionally, constructed summaries for NFAF and
SMS ships were modified by References 63, 64, 65, and 66.
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^Reference 3 lists 58 ships in the construction/
conversion program. Author is using 56 to reflect the
delivery and active status of T-AGOS #3 and one T-AKR (MPS)
in Reference 2. (This MPS ship is the second one
delivered.
)
40 Of the 56 ships, 24 ships are carried in an
inactive status in Reference 2. They are T-AGGS #4 through
#9, and 15 T-AKR's (4-FSS's: T-AKR #289 through #292, and
11-MPS's) (see Figure 2-8). The remaining 32 new
construction/conversion ships will be added to the inventory
as follows:
a. Twenty-two ships will be simply added. Included are
six T-AGOS #13 through #18, two T-AH's #19 and #20,
thirteen T-AO 187 class, and one T-AVB which is
currently not in the inventory as an RRF because it is
in the yards.
b. Eight ships will be added as replacements for other
existing ships. Included are two T-AGS #30 and #40
for USNS Bowditch and USNS Dutton (T-AGS 21 and 22)
,
T-AGM 24 for USNS Sentinel Ranger (T-AGM 22) , and five
T-AOT 1121 class for five T-5 tankers.
c. Two ships are being converted to another class. One
will become a T-AG 195 and the other will become the
second T-AVB.
41(55 ships commercially manned) $ (64 total
active and reserve ships less RRF) = 85.9 per cent.
^Excludes bareboat charters. (40 ships under
charter, excluding sealift tankers and two USNS RORO's)
t (64 total active and reserve ships less RRF) = 62.5
per cent.
43(21 vessels commercially owned and operated)
f (25 total MSS ships) = 84 per cent.
44two of the thirteen MPS ships and four of eight
FSS ships have been delivered. The remainder of the ships




V . EVALUAT 1 N_ 0F_ GP S_ UE_ F R_ MSC_ USE
A. REQUIREMENT
Inclusion of the NAVSTAR GPS program in PCM-86 reflects
the stated need for military GPS UE on surface ships. In
the missions of the U.S. Navy, the Military Sealift Command
(MSC) provides sealift capability. As a result of the
emphasis placed on strategic sealift, the primary role of
MSC is to provide contingency support and strategic mobility
in terms of sealift, as discussed in Chapter I. Peacetime
logistics is secondary. Strategic sealift is a key factor
in deciding whether to provide military or commercial GPS UE
to MSC ships. The other key factor is that TRANSIT is
expected to be phased out by the end of 19 94.
Currently, the Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force (NFAF and
Special Mission Support (SMS) ships are funded for military
GPS UE [Ref . 1] . The NFAF ships are funded because they
directly support the fleet. SMS ships are funded because of
the special missions they support (e.g., surveying).
At this time, no plans have been made for Strategic
Sealift (STRAT) and Miscellaneous Service Support (MSS)
ships. STRAT and MSS ships can benefit from the
improvements which will be available with GPS. STRAT and
MSS ships need GPS UE because they use TRANSIT and OMEGA for
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primary ocean navigation, and LORAN-C (where available) for
primary coastal navigation. As discussed in Chapter I, all
these radionavigation systems are scheduled for DOD
phase-out in the 1990 's, In view of the emphasis currently
placed on strategic sealift, together with the phase-out
plans for existing navigation systems these ships will need
GPS UE. The question becomes whether to provide MSC STRAT
and MSS ships with military or commercial GPS UE.
In the author's judgement a decision must be made
regarding whether military or commercial GPS UE is to be
used on MSC ships, particularly on those in the Strategic
Sealift (STRAT) group. This decision needs to be made
bearing in mind that the primary mission is to provide
sealift in contingency situations. The STRAT ships are
considered to be a major support element for the military in
a contingency. Considering this, it is important to examine
the alternatives of providing military or commercial GPS UE.
Equipment characteristics and/or capabilities, security, and
other factors impact on the decision of which alternatives
to select. These factors include cost, equipment
availability, and scheduling. Cost includes the purchase
price and installation cost of GPS UE. Figures provided in
this thesis indicate only rough estimates, but are where
military and commercial GPS UE vary significantly.
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B. EXAMINATION OF CONSIDERATIONS IN MSC USE OF GPS UE
The following presents an examination of considerations
regarding the use of GPS UE to fulfill MSC's operational
need. Major items are equipment capability (equipment
characteristics and technology) , security, and other factors
(cost, equipment availability, and schedule)
.
1 • Equipment. Capability
This section examines several statements concerning
use of GPS UE on MSC ships. The format in this section
provides information on the equipment capability under
consideration, presents a statement on the subject, and
provides points of agreement and disagreement with the
statement.
a. Equipment Characteristics Include Military
Design, Commonality, and the Latest Technology
(1) Mil itary_ Design. The primary equipment
characteristic is the design of military GPS UE for a
military environment. While military [Refs. 6;61;63;68] and
commercial [Refs. 43;69] sources agree that military design
features (such as hardening) would not be required during
peacetime, viewpoints differed as to whether or not they
would be useful to MSC ships during a contingency.
a. Statement. MSC ships should be equipped v/ith GPS UE




1. Koberger [Ref. 70 :p. 310] states that the merchant
marine, usually involved in commercial shipping,
does not normally consider providing ships with
hardened equipment.
2. Magnavox [Ref. 43] stated that hardening and
anti-jamming features should not be needed on MSC
ships.
3. Steward [Ref. 29:p. 40] explains that the concept
behind the Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS)
ships is that they should be in safe passage
(unopposed during transit) to the objective area,
and that a Naval escort would be provided if
needed. What "unopposed" meant was not defined.
c. Agree.
1. Koberger in Reference 70 agrees with JPO
[Ref. 18 :p. 30] that electromagnetic pulse (EMP)
bursts are unpredictable in terms of time of
occurance, duration, and magnitude. He also
states that twenty years ago, tests over Johnson
Island tended to indicate that high altitude
thermonuclear blasts can send out an EMP which
burns out unhardened or unprotected transistorized
and computerized electronics for thousands of
miles. [Ref. 70:p. 309]
.
2. The Navy DPM [Ref. 6] stated that the military GPS
UE, being designed to protect the equipment, will
provide at least some measure of survivability.
3. Even if MSC ships are not expected to be in
dangerous or opposition areas^ MSC ships, such as
STRAT, NFAF, and SMS ships need to reach their
destination. MSC currently requires a certain
amount of minimum protective standards. For
instance, washdown drills are held quarterly
[Ref. 71: p. 1-90, para. 1-16-3]. Equipment is
issued and procedures are established for
chemical, biological, and radiation (CBR) training
in USNS ships [Ref. 72:p. 2-1-6, para 2-1-6].
Additionally, the crew receives extra pay when
entering hazardous or war-zone areas.
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d. Summary. The contingency environment, for which MSC
ships (STRAT, NFAF, and SMS ships - those that provide
strategic sealift) are to be prepared, has no
guarantee of being peaceful. Plans for contingencies
are made to respond effectively, if and when needed.
Preparation to accomplish this includes planning for
equipment requirements as well as for operations. For
this reason, equipment which is militarily designed
must be considered for those MSC ships intended for
use in a contingency situation. Nothing guarantees
safe passage, or the availability of a Naval escort,
for example, for the MPS ships. At the minimum, a
certain amount of hardening is desirable. This, as
well as the equipment (e.g., NBC gear) currently on
board, will provide some protection and survivability.
(1) Commonality. Commonality and design to
meet rigid military specifications are key features of
military GPS UE. One argument heard is that military GPS UE
will have older technology built in because of mil-specs,
whereas while commercial versions will quickly incorporate
the latest technology quickly.
a. Statement. Commonality of military GPS UE is
desirable for MSC ships as well as for the Naval
fleet.
b. Disagree.
1. One MSCPAC staff member [Ref. 61] said that
purchasing and servicing TRANSIT navigation
equipment is not currently a problem, that
follow-on maintenance is minimal, and that the
largest costs are up-front.
2. A statement from Navidyne [Ref. 45] was that for
the extra cost in purchasing military GPS UE, an
entire set(s) of parts and spares could probably
be provided to each ship.
3. Magnavox [Ref. 43] stated that they and other
commercial companies provide world-wide service
facilities for their navigation products.
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c. Agree. The Navy DPM said [Ref . 6] that mil-spec and
commonality features are required for sound
configuration management and effective logistic
support for GPS UE because so many military platforms
will have the equipment.
d. Summary. The author feels that commonality is useful
for the military system, MSC government-owned and
bareboat chartered ships, and ships under long-term
charters (e.g., fifteen to twenty years) to MSC, but
that it would not be useful for ships under short-term
charters.
( 2 ) Lates t_Technology
a. Statement. Commercial GPS UE featuring the latest
technology is an advantage for MSC ships.
b. Disagree.
1. MSC personnel [Refs. 60;62;83] stated that the
navigation equipment provided is the one that can
do the job. Once installed, it is not replaced
only to provide the most recent technological
features. Therefore, the new construction/
conversion ships benefit the most from new
technologies.
2. A military statement from JPO [Ref. 6] was that
commonality and design of replaceable components
can allow updating military GPS UE.
c. Agree. Commercial sources [Refs. 43; 46] and MSC
personnel [Refs. 62;83] agree that the availability of
the latest technology in commercial GPS UE is an
advantage, for example, in equipping new construction/
conversion ships with navigation equipment.
d. Summary. The availability of the latest technology in
commercial GPS UE is a trade-off with the military
design and commonality features of military GPS.
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b. Technological Capabilities Include the 100 Meter
(2 drms) Accuracy Level of SPS, Degradation and
PPS Accuracy, and Two-Channel Equipment.
(1) SPS_Accuracy. SPS accuracy is to be
provided at 100 meters (2 drms)
.
a. Statement. Accuracy at 100 meters (2 drms) is
sufficient for general marine navigation (oceanic)
.
b. Disagree. None.
c. Agree. Commercial sources [Refs. 43;45] and MSC
personnel [Refs. 59;61;76] agreed.
d. Summary. The 100 meter (2 drms) accuracy is
sufficient for most MSC ships.
( 2
)
Deg r adat ipn_ and_ PPS_Accuracy . Current
policy is that the government can degrade accuracy to worse
than 100 meters (2 drms)
.
a. Statement. This policy may drive the need for access
to PPS accuracy by MSC ships which can be used for
strategic sealift (STRAT, NFAF, and SMS ships)
.
b. Disagree.
1. Although the government has the right to control
and degrade any of the radionavigation systems it
operates [Ref. 8:p. 105], this right has not been
exercised. Accuracy is not likely to be degraded
by the government because even during a
contingency, navigation is required by both
military participants and civil non-participants.
For instance, navigation systems were not degraded
during the Falkland Island Crisis.
2. An interagency agreement between the Department of
Defense (DOD) and the Department of Transportation
(DOT) recognizes that the two agencies have joint
responsibility to ensure that both military and
civil needs are met. Implicit in this joint
effort is the assurance of civil sector radio-
navigation readiness for mobilization in national
emergencies. [Ref. 9:p. 14]
91
c. Agree. Koberger [Ref. 70 :p. 309] states that time is
a critical factor in contingencies. This is true
whether supplies are being delivered or if a ship is
to rendezvous with an escort or at a remote area
lacking port facilities for beach offloading. If
commercial GPS UE were installed on MSC ships (e.g.,
Prepositioning Force (PPF) ships) , it could later be
determined that a ship requires access to PPS,
hardening features, and/or military GPS UE for
navigation. Depending on what kind of commercial GPS
UE has been installed, time could be saved or lost.
For example, if non-hardened commercial GPS UE with
only C/A capability for SPS accuracy had been
installed, then valuable time could be lost, if the
navigation equipment and particularly the cabling
needs to be replaced. This is particularly true if
the ship has already deployed (either the ship needs
to return to port or proceed as it is equipped) . For
example, for ships in port, even if communications
equipment has to be installed and cargo has to be
loaded, there is no guarantee that there would be
enough time to install or modify additional equipment;
nor is there any guarantee that parts or resources
will be available.
d. Summary. If commercial equipment were decided to be
used, at the very least, the cabling should meet
military specifications for military GPS UE in order
to save time by eliminating the need to replace
cabling. Cabling installed depends on the antenna to
be used, and generally speaking, commercial quality
grade cabling is not the same as military cabling.
Regarding installation, using military cabling (even
for commercial equipment) would improve impedence and
reduce signal loss. [Ref. 73] More important, it
would then allow changing the cable ends and adding
equipment capable of PPS accuracy.
(3) TwprChannel_ Equipment . Medium dynamic
(MD) two-channel military GPS UE was designed for use on
surface ships. Most commercial equipment being designed for
general marine navigation will be one-channel GPS UE.
a. Statement. MSC ships require one- channel GPS UE for
general marine navigation.
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b. Disagree. There was no disagreement to this
statement.
c. Agree.
1. Military and commercial sources, [Refs. 43;45;46;
60;61;69;74:p. 268;75:pp. 71 f 83;76] all agree that
one-channel GPS UE is sufficient for MSC ships
involved in general marine navigation.
Specifically, a Navidyne official [Ref. 45] stated
that unless a ship required two-channel equipment
(for instance, for shore bombardment from a moving
vehicle or for survey operations) , single-channel
equipment is sufficient. Magnavox [Ref. 43]
concurred, adding that even many fleet ships could
use single-channel commercial GPS UE and not be
degraded in mission capability in terms of
navigation accuracy.
2. Additionally, MSC personnel [Refs. 61;76] stated
that two-channel capability would not be required
for the following NFAF and SMS ships: T-AE, T-AF,
T-AFS, T-AK/FBM, T-AO, and T-ATF.
d. Summary. Unless MSC ships are involved in special
operations, they require one-channel GPS UE. Ideally,
military GPS UE would provide one-channel versus
two-channel GPS UE sets for general marine navigation.
2 . Secu r i ty
Current DOD policy is that civil users who desire
access to PPS will need to provide adequate security
protection to the crypto (secure) device that will allow
access to PPS. The GPS UE set itself is unclassified; the
key code device is classified. With the exception of the
NFAF and SMS ships, most of the other ships cannot currently
provide security protection for classified material.
Masters of these ships have a safe to hold confidential
material if required, but this is avoided when possible.
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Material of higher classification is not stored aboard the
ship.
It is also important to consider physical security
aboard MSC ships. Piracy exists, and sabotage can be a
concern. For example, when loaded, a tanker rides low in
the water, with approximately 15 feet of freeboard at the
main deck. Recently an MSC tanker was boarded by seven
pirates while transiting the Singapore Straits at a slow
speed [Ref . 77:pp. 1-2] . There are, however, certain
accommodations that can be made. Specifically, those ships
lacking secure facilities could have GPS UE installed; then,
when needed, the added keying device or access card could be
provided to the ship, with a seagoing guard if necessary.
Upon rendezvous the device could be turned over to military
personnel. [Ref. 78] Military GPS UE could be installed
with the key being issued when needed [Ref. 73]; commercial
GPS UE capable of access to PPS could be also installed in
the same way. Because commercial GPS UE with PPS capability
will increase in price, it is envisioned that many
commercial GPS UE sets for general marine navigation will
not provide this feature. In any event, when needed, the
key code would be provided and the equipment could then be
restored to full capability. While this may work for units
ashore, extra logistic efforts may be necessary to provide
the device to deployed ships. Advanced planning is
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necessary to minimize the loss of time which could be
critical in a contingency.
The author's judgement is that GPS UE installed on
STRAT, NFAF, and SMS ships must have the capability for PPS
access so that the primary mission can be met. The key code
should not be kept aboard except on units deployed with
military personnel who do have secure facilities (e.g.,
communications detachment, or communications mil-van) . For
example, MPS flagships and alternate flagships should be
provided with GPS UE that has PPS. Other PPF ships (e.g.,
T-AKR (FFS's), T-ACS's, and T-AVB's) should use the suitcase
method when deployed in a contingency, in that the key code
is carried aboard for the voyage. All STRAT ships in the
PPF should have military GPS UE installed, or at least
commercial GPS UE with the capability for PPS accuracy
service. If it were decided that CUOT and RRF ships are to
use commercial GPS UE, then it is the author's judgement
that cabling meeting military specifications should be used.
Besides the improvements mentioned earlier, this would allow
easier change-overs to military GPS UE end units such as the
antenna and user set components (plus terminal and
connectors) in the event military GPS UE were used later.
Again, if commercial GPS UE were procured, it should have
PPS capability.
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The author feels that no special equipment or
cabling is required for each MSS ship determined to be
unsuitable for use in strategic sealift.
The concept in equipping RRF ships is to use
off-the-shelf equipment. While this may be the policy, the
author feels that the cabling used in the installation
should meet the specifications for PPS access and,
preferably, the use of military GPS UE. This not only
enables access to PPS if and when required, and use of
military GPS UE if this should be decided on later, but also
slowly builds the contingency capability in the U.S. flag
fleet. Further, a requirement for GPS UE for navigation in
the RRF ships should be added to the RRF ship-enhancement
requirements.
3 . Pthe r_ Factors
a. Cost
Unit-for-unit, the military can expect to pay
more because military equipment meets rigid specifications
and is designed for military contingency use. This costs;
the military pays for it. (As discussed in Chapter III,
although prices of commercial GPS UE are unknown at this
time, they can be expected to be competitive with prices of




Both military and commercial per unit prices for
GPS UE are expected to decrease over time. However, the
military will pay more for military GPS UE because of the
rigid specification requirements, than if commercial GPS UE
were purchased.
One aspect to consider is the overall cost to
DOD versus the cost to MSC alone or JPO alone. In terms of
both the purchase of equipment and installation, several
considerations can be addressed even though costs and prices
are not yet known. For instance, military GPS UE requires
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) funding, and therefore
plans need to be made well ahead of time. If military GPS
UE were purchased for MSC ships, NAVSEA would be responsible
for the installation. Military GPS UE could be installed in
one of two ways: pierside by an Augment Installation Team
(AIT), or in a shipyard. The team concept, preferred by JPO
because it is less expensive than a shipyard installation,
would be handled by NAVSEA; the shipyard installation, by
NAVSEA or MSC (as assigned by NAVSEA) and would occur
normally in a commercial shipyard (naval shipyards are
occasionally used) . One difference between MSC ships and
the U.S. Naval fleet is that MSC ship availability periods
are shorter. If military GPS UE were to be installed, MSC
ship operational schedules might impact on installation
scheduling.
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If commercial GPS UE were purchased, Navy
Industrial Fund (NIF) funding would be used. Since NIF
funding is a revolving account, POM planning would not be
required by MSC, but would be required by the commands
receiving shipping services from MSC.
Even though MSC has several ways to purchase
commercial GPS UE under NIF funding (for example, large-lot
buy — 20 units instead of a single unit, or letting ship
owners buy their own equipment), the cost still comes back
to DOD. This is because MSC charges those to whom shipping
service is provided, and these customers receive funding
from POM submissions. Installation of commercial GPS UE
would be handled by MSC. Again, several methods are
available: MSC could purchase and arrange for installation
in a commercial shipyard, purchase the equipment and have
the shipowner install it, or (as would usually be the case),
simply have the shipowner purchase and install his own
equipment.
In any event, in addition to determining whether
military or commercial GPS UE should be provided, the costs
of procurring and installing GPS UE need to be considered.
As an example, the estimated total of the
military GPS UE purchase price plus AIT installation cost
can be less than the estimated total of purchasing
commercial GPS UE plus a shipyard installation cost, as
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depicted in Figure 5-1. Costs, derived from Reference 79,
are the best estimates available at this writing. The




Mil2 tary_ GPS_ UE_i FY_ 7 9__ Dol la r si . $68,713
reflects the estimated average cost per one two-channel MD
set for one T-AO 187 class ship. (The author estimated per
set costs for one T-AO 187 class ship by dividing the
estimated total number of sets to be purchased into the
total estimated equipment procurement cost provided in
Reference 79.) The cost of $68,713 is the estimated other
procurement Navy (OPN) cost [Ref. 79:p. 75]. It includes
the user set components plus spares, installation kit cost,
cables, and government production support [Ref. 5]. The
cost of the receiver RPU and other components was estimated
at $54,534. [Ref. 79:p. 256] The higher cost of purchasing
military GPS UE reflected in Figure 5-1 is the result of
rigid specifications and design requirements which must be
met in producing military equipment [Ref. 6]. For instance,
requirements for military design include the Navy hammer
blow test (impact test), hardening, anti- jamming
,
temperature cycling tests, fungus tests, and space/weight
specifications [Ref. 80].
(2) Cpmmercial_GPS_UE_. Magnavox estimates
that commercial GPS UE purchase prices will be approximately






2 r- <y\ If) coO LD o\ in in
H o\° ro CN V£> P CN
Eh O •» 1 •» •. **
< in <tf rH m 5*




























Eh o\o v£> CN) <Ti P CN
(H O » 1 «* •. W-


















s J r» o r» P iH
>h E-i < - •. 1 >» w-
a M Eh 00 in ro o
< 2 CO VD r~» "* r^






















•H Eh rd CD
TD P TD p -—- >i Cr>
0) £ CD rd a c
P CD P i—
i
Eh -H fd
rd 6 fd t-H H X fa
E Cu £ td < CO J
-H -H •H p < 0\°P D P en Eh o
cn tr en C O CN







en en en 4H
rd fd
X! u P










a) p rd rH
x fd rH
P X! en rd
P TD p
P CD en
rd - CD c
M CJ IH
C CD X ^
> CD td en
•H CD C V4
P -s G rd fd
rd O H
rH X! •H • P rHH P Eh d o
rd TD rd H CD Q
P CD rH < E
en P rH CD O





TD <D C TD fa
CD X! •H (D V4 —
H rH fa
M TD TD H ffa
CD rH U rd fa -H
14-1 D rd P D X
CD >i en CO
• U X a C CO
en ffa en •H •H fa en
u X O en
fd CD P en P rd
rH X M rH rH




X! • X > en r-
C W P •H Eh 00
CTi D •H X! rH
[*>
-H 5 rd w TD
P> CO D (D O
JH rd fa w en p <
fa rH U D CD CO rd 1
rH P (^ E Eh
c rd >iC0 rd O •HH P n CU E P CD
en rd o -H rH en d
CD C P> P rd fa O
M -H -H >1 en •H
fd rH H CD u
Eh -H rd M •
en H E p CD CD rH
P < •H Cr> E 1
en M rH £ E m
C •H rd
U <C 14-4 E ^ CJ CD
U
2









The lower cost of 30 per cent and the more expensive cost of
50 per cent, and ranges of + 20 per cent are shown in
Figures 5-1 and 5-2. Because navigation equipment is mature
(although electronic/digital improvements could still
occur) , and because major technical changes to GPS UE are
not expected, ±20 was selected to provide ranges for the
estimated costs.
(3) Installation. Costs.. The GPS program
office determined that a shipyard installation was three to
five times more expensive than a pierside installation
[Ref. 81 :p. 4] depending on the location of the
installation. Another estimation for the cost of installing
GPS UE during Phase II of GPS testing was approximately
$70,000 for a team installation as opposed to $169,000 for a
shipyard installation [Ref. 82:pp. 34,39]. This study
showed that the estimated shipyard installation (no overtime
involved) was more than the estimated cost for the team
installation by a factor of 2.4 (approximately). Using the
conservative 2.4 factor with an estimated cost of $75,000
(FY 79 dollars) [Ref. 79:p. 256] for a team installation of
military GPS UE on a T-AO 187 class MSC ship, results in an
estimated shipyard installation cost of $181,299 (FY 79
dollars) . Estimated installation costs and' ranges are
summarized in Figure 5-2.
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(at 30% of military
equipment)
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$75,000 $60,000 to $90,000
$181,299 $145,039 to $217,559
Figure 5-2. Estimated GPS UE Purchase and Installation
Costs and ±20% Ranges of Cost for One
T-AO 187 Class Ship (FY 79 Dollars)
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As depicted in Figure 5-1, the lower price
of commercial GPS UE can be offset by the higher cost of a
shipyard installation. In the example used, the total
estimated cost of the military GPS UE set with an AIT
installation was $37,586 less than the estimated shipyard
cost alone. The team installation concept, the preferred
method of installation at the JPO [Ref . 6] , can only be used
when military GPS UE is procured. AIT installations would
be handled by NAVSEA. If commercial GPS UE were procured,
the installation would be done in a shipyard under the
Master Ship Repair Agreement. MSC or the ship owner, as
directed by MSC, would handle the installation. [Ref. 83]
Even if the military GPS UE/AIT installation
is underestimated, the 20 per cent higher cost of $172,456
is still lower than the commercial equipment purchase at
both 30 and 50 per cent plus a shipyard installation.
Comparing the high range for the military GPS UE/AIT
combination with optimistic lower costs for the two (30 per
cent and 50 per cent) commercial equipment/shipyard
combinations, the high estimate of military GPS UE/AIT at
$172,456 is higher than the commercial GPS UE (30 per cent)/
shipyard combination by $10,926, but slightly lower than the
commercial GPS UE (50 per cent)/shipyard combination (by
$68) . Therefore, the average combination cost of military
GPS UE/AIT installation is lower than the average
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combinations of commercial equipment (at both 30 and 50 per
cent) with a shipyard installation. Furthermore, the
military GPS UE/AIT installation combination at its worst
case ($172,456) is still lower than the best case commercial
GPS UE at 50 per cent/shipyard installation combination
($172,524) . The worst case military combination ($172,456)
is slightly higher however, than the best case combination
of commercial GPS UE at 30 per cent/shipyard installation.
Therefore, the best combination in terms of GPS UE
procurement plus installation cost appears to be the
purchase of military GPS UE with AIT installation.
An additional consideration is that the cost of
failing to meet the mission in a contingency or war is
difficult to estimate. However, in any kind of contingency
(for instance, in the Falklands), time is a crucial factor.
If war erupts in Europe, an estimated ten million tons of
military supplies and fifteen million tons of fuel will need
to be delivered to NATO in the first three months.
Furthermore, almost all will have to go by sea [Ref. 70 :p.
309] . As described earlier, while an argument can be
presented that the ships can be equipped with required gear
as they are loaded, there is no guarantee that time,
equipment, and resources will be available to carry out this
additional requirement. However, if commercial GPS UE with
the capability for PPS accuracy were installed, it would be
faster to provide the required key card.
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The same is true if commercial equipment were
installed (e.g., by shipowner or government) and if it were
later determined that military GPS UE should have been used,
Having installed military-specified cabling in the first
place, (for the commercial GPS UE) , it would be faster to
simply replace the system components (e.g., antenna, RPU,
CDU, and FMI) and cable termination ends than to also have
to rip out the old cabling and replace it with new cabling
suitable for military GPS UE or PPS access with commercial
GPS UE.
b. Equipment Availability
MSC ships will need to be equipped with either
military GPS UE, which will be available during GPS Phase
III production, or with commercial GPS UE which is expected
to be available from a wide range of manufacturers when GPS
is fully operational (as described in Chapter III).
Commercial GPS UE from companies formerly or currently
involved with government GPS UE can be expected to be
available earlier [Ref. 45]. For instance, Magnavox
[Ref. 44] and Rockwell- Collins [Ref. 46] both plan to have
products available in mid-1985.
c. Schedule
Chapter I provided the planned phase-out
schedule^ of existing radionavigation systems that MSC
ships currently use. Phase-out periods end in 1992, 1993,
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and 19 94 for OMEGA, LORAN-C, and TRANSIT, respectively.
However, LORAN-C is expected to continue to be available
until year 2000, and there is limited Navy use of OMEGA
possible after 1993. The POM-86 lists the year in which the
equipment is to be installed, then two years are allowed to
complete the installation. Of the NFAF and SMS ships
scheduled for military GPS UE, 39 per cent (16 ships; T-AE,
T-AFS, T-AO 187 class) will not meet the 1994 TRANSIT
phase-out completion unless the UE can be procured and
installed all within 1994. The remaining NFAF and SMS ships
(25 ships, 61 per cent) scheduled for military GPS UE will
meet the planned phase-out schedule. Of course, should the
radionavigation phase-out schedule slip, then more time
would be available for installation.
All other MSC ships will need to have had plans
made for either military or commercial GPS UE. Because
LORAN-C, OMEGA, and TRANSIT are used, planning should be in
terms of the earliest system scheduled for phase-cut, which
is OMEGA in 1992. However, OMEGA is used in conjunction
with TRANSIT satellite navigators and these navigators would
be able to continue using TRANSIT information. Therefore,
the year in which GPS UE installations must be completed is
19 94 to meet the end of TRANSIT phase-out.
Whether military or commercial GPS UE is to be
used in MSC ships determines how far in advance planning
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needs to be done or action taken. In order for JPO to plan,
coordinate, and provide military GPS UE for MSC ships not
already included in POM- 86, additional ships must be
identified now. To be included in the Five-Year Defense
Plan (FYDP) , the ship requirements should be included in
POM-88; to meet the TRANSIT phase-out schedule, the latest





Requirements identified by 1984-85 1985-88
sponsor/user. Plans for
requirements and any Navy
unique features are made.
JPO makes final approval
for military GPS UE.
POM requirements for all 1985 1989
service/agency users prepared
at JPO level for PME 106-2.
POM input submitted to SECDEF.
POM inputs processed at 1986 19 90
SECDEF level.
POM submitted into President's 1987 1991
budget. Funds appropriated.
POM funds available for 19 88 19 92
action/installation begins.
FYDP: Budget year plus four 1988-92 - -
years.
Installation period. - - 1992-94
107
However, it should be noted that the POM-92
schedule assumes that installations can all be done in the
two-year installation period. It does not consider the
impact on the schedule for other service installations, nor
does it consider the impact on schedules prepared at the JPO
level. This is a worst case schedule. It is the author's
judgement that requirements for additional military GPS UE
be made earlier then POM-92 to allow more flexibility at the
end of the 1986-1994 period.
If commercial GPS UE is to be used on MSC ships,
installation will need to be scheduled prior to 1994.
Additionally, requirements for GPS UE should be specified in
charter contracts first, so that phased-out navigation
systems are not relied on to meet the SATNAV requirement of
the charter and second, so that the benefits of GPS are
used.
The decision as to whether military or
commercial GPS UE is to be provided to ships in the MSC
Fleet needs to be made in the near term. This is
particularly true if military GPS UE is used because the
additional requirement will impact on the GPS program
schedules, planning, and priorities, and requires POM
funding.
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C. EVALUATION OF MILITARY GPS UE FOR CURRENTLY SCHEDULED
SHIPS
NFAF and SMS ships are currently scheduled for military
GPS UE as discussed in Chapter IV. The following are the
advantages and disadvantages of providing military GPS UE to
NFAF and SMS ships.
1 . Advantages
a. Military GPS UE fully meets MSC's mission,
particularly the primary mission of strategic sealift.
b. The equipment provides full range of GPS accuracies
(both PPS and SPS) to the ships to a degree of
accuracy not obtainable from any other navigation
system available today or in the foreseeable future
[Ref . : 40 :p. 1] .
c. Continuous twenty-four hour coverage in any weather
will be available to a ship located anywhere on earth
when GPS is fully operational.
d. Military GPS UE meets the GPS commonality objective
which is important for logistics supply and
configuration management of GPS. The equipment has
modular components for maximum interchangeability of
parts.
e. Military GPS UE is a long term solution for MSC as
well as for U.S. Navy fleet ships and other Navy
platforms.
f. Such a provision equips NFAF and SMS ships with
comparable or the same GPS UE that the Navy operating
fleet has. For NFAF ships, and in a contingency for
SMS ships, this means that rendezvous and other
operations with the fleet can be conducted with the
same equipment (hence capabilities) being available to
both parties.
g. Military GPS UE is designed for the harsh environment




h. This provision takes advantage of GPS program
development and resources spent to date.
Additionally, the government can take advantage of
large lot buys, and AIT team installation (cheaper
installation than at a shipyard) . Also, combining the
purchase of military GPS UE with AIT installation is
less expensive than purchasing commercial GPS UE and
using shipyard installation.
2 . P i sadyant acjes
a. The use of more expensive military specifications for
the equipment may not be required operationally. If
this is the case, unnecessary expenditures will be
incurred.
b. Military GPS UE will have obsolete technology built
in. However, the UE was designed with modular
components for maximum interchangeability which will
maximize this problem.
c. Two-channel equipment is scheduled where one-channel
equipment is sufficient [Refs. 43 ; 45 ;63 ;78] .
Two-channel equipment is more expensive unit-for-unit
than is one-channel equipment, therefore extra costs
are incurred.
3 . Options
The Medium Dynamic (MD) GPS UE set was designed for
surface ships. The Low Dynamic (LD) GPS UE was also tested
for use in surface ships. Advantages and disadvantages are
as follows.
a. Medium Dynamic (MD) Two-Channel GPS UE
(1) Advantages. The MD GPS UE set is designed
expressly for use on surface ships. The second channel,
while not needed, unless required by a special mission,
(e.g., fine control which is not applicable to NFAF or SMS
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ships) is an added benefit. Specifically, user set response
times are reduced by 1.5 minutes [Ref. 18:pp. 32-33]. 46
(2) Disadvantages. None, except that the MD
set has a higher price tag.
b. Low Dynamic (LD) One-Channel Manpack GPS UE
(1) Advantages. One-channel capability is
less expensive than the MD GPS UE sets, is easily and
quickly installed, and fully meets military requirements.
(2) Disadvantages. For most surface ships,
ship dynamics in rough waters preclude use of the LD set.
Specifically, the antenna mounted on the mast can result in
lever arm motion exceeding the 40 knot upper range for which
the LD set is designed. For example, at sea state four, the
antenna lever arm velocity can be greater than ship forward
velocity. [Ref. 84]
4 . Recpmmendat ion
Use military GPS UE in NFAF and SMS ships as
scheduled.
D. EVALUATION OF MILITARY GPS UE ALTERNATIVE FOR
NON-SCHEDULED SHIPS
The following are advantages and disadvantages of
providing military GPS UE to the STRAT and MSS ships.
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1 . Advantages. fpr_ STRAT_ Ships
In addition to advantages listed for NFAF and SMS
ships, advantages for STRAT ships (CUOT, PPF, and RRF ships)
are:
a. Military GPS UE provides the same capabilities on the
same equipment as NFAF, SMS and Navy Fleet ships.
This helps logistically if parts are needed and
increases the commonality base. It is particularly
applicable for long-term charters and government-owned
ships.
b. In the event PPF ships proceed along (without escort)
during contingencies, they are provided with
militarily designed equipment. If it is then needed
(e.g., long range EMP burst), protection is available.
The ships are prepared. This is no different than
providing protection to an NFAF or SMS ship which
could make a solo transit.
c. SPS accuracy can be provided on a full time basis,
with PPS accessibility provided by using the key code.
In the event there is a possibility of degradation to
worse than 100 meters for SPS accuracy, PPS can be
made available.
d. Such provision will enhance the capabilities of the
U.S. flag fleet. For instance, the time charters,
when returned to owners, will have had militarily
specified cables installed. At the end of the charter
period the military GPS UE (antenna, RPU, CDU, and
FMI) could be removed (government furnished equipment)
or possibly sold to the owner. However, if it were
removed the cabling could remain, thereby increasing
the usefulness of the ship for later contingency use
or time chartering. RRF ships (MARAD assets) are also
enhanced.
e. Military GPS UE would allow the use of AIT
installation (because military equipment is being
provided) on CUOT, PPF and RRF ships. An AIT
installation is considerably less expensive than a
shipyard installation.
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2 . Pisadyantas£S_£pr_ STRAT_ Ships
a. Most ships lack secure spaces for classified material
(keycode allowing access to PPS will be classified)
.
Moreover, physical security is vulnerable on ships
with low freeboard. However, by providing the
key/code for PPS access, on a basis as needed, and by
initially installing GPS UE and cabling which allow
use of PPS, the ships are fully equipped like the
operating Navy fleet ships (with the exception that
the key code for PPS access is not carried on board)
.
An escort may be required with the use of the PPS key
card. Using the device requires additional planning
(e.g., storage ashore) and time provided by personnel.
[Ref. 78]
b. The rest of the ship is not hardened or militarily
prepared. This would be a start. Enhancement
programs such as the one to upgrade RRF ships are
meant to equip ships so they can meet mission
requirements [Ref. 33].
c. Military GPS UE is not user friendly. Because
military GPS UE will be capable to do more (e.g., fire
control) , the equipment will have more user features
(e.g., knobs) and can be more complicated than
commercial GPS UE for this reason.
.
(The civil
merchant mariner is used to simple equipment.)
[Ref. 61] However, advantages from GPS navigation
itself, as discussed in Chapter III, provide user
friendliness.
d. Some ships are foreign built and so are not in the
COSAL system. This problem can be dealt with on a
case-by-case basis.
e. Flexibility of MSC in arranging for equipment is
reduced. The commercial purchase of commercial GPS UE
results in a shipyard installation, which is more
expensive than an AIT team installation of military
GPS UE.
3 . Adyantaaes_j;or_MSS_ Ships
Same as advantages listed above.
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4.
Disadvantages. fpr_ MS S_ Ships
a. Ships are not suitable for strategic sealift
operations [Ref. 34] therefore they do not need
equipment to meet contingencies.
b. Some ships are on the shorter time charters, or are
voyage charters. For this, the normal method of doing
business can be used; that is, operate and work with
the ship owners as if MSC were a commercial
enterprise. [Ref. 61] The ship owner would provide a
commercially equipped ship. However, this may result
in a higher cost to DOD overall. (DOD customers to
whom MSC provides shipping service eventually pay the
bill for the equipment and installation.)
5 Options
The same options (MD or LD) exist for STRAT and MSS
as for NFAF and SMS ships. The advantages and disadvantages
of MD and LD military GPS UE are the same as for NFAF and
SMS ships, except for small vessels in the MSS ship group as
follows:
a. Advantages of using LD sets on small MSS vessels are
that the one-.channel LD manpack is suitable for small
vessels and boats which operate in calm waters. For
example, the tugboats could use manpacks [Ref. 84].
This reduces the cost of procurement. Installation is
easy and fast, and the equipment fully meets military
requirements.
b. There are no disadvantages of using LD sets on small
MSS vessels unless the vessels are prohibited to have
lithium batteries on board as are Naval vessels.
(Modifications are being made to manpacks (battery
replacement) to allow use of manpacks on board small
Navy vessels.) [Ref. 84]
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6 . Recpmmendat ions
Provide military GPS UE to the STRAT ships and
keycode for access to PPS when need is anticipated. Do not
provide military GPS UE to the MSS ships, except when
manpacks can be used.
E. EVALUATION OF COMMERCIAL GPS UE ALTERNATIVE FOR
NON-SCHEDULED SHIPS
The alternative to providing STRAT and MSS ships with
military GPS UE is to equip them with commercial GPS UE
.
The following are .advantages and disadvantages of doing so
for both STRAT and MSS ships, except as noted.
1 . Advantages
a. DOD Federal Navigation Policy implies that
radionavigation methods will be provided to civilian
users so that they can meet mobilization requirements,
should they be needed (see the discussion earlier in
this chapter)
.
b. With commercial equipment capable of PPS accuracy, the
key code could be provided as would be done with the
military GPS UE. The full range of GPS accuracy- would
then be available.
c. Commercial GPS UE fully meets requirement for a
peacetime navigation system.
d. Equipping MSC ships with commercial equipment is the
standard way of doing business at MSC. Allowing ship
owners to do so takes the worry out of MSC's hands.
[Ref. 62]
e. Commercial GPS UE provides flexibility as to the
different ways to accomplish the job of outfitting
ships with commercial GPS UE. For example, MSC could
purchase and install equipment; MSC could purchase,
but the owner would install the equipment; or the
owner could purchase and install the equipment. MSC
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is not bound to military channels and installation
schedules
.
f. MSC could arrange for a multiple unit buy. This would
result in a lower overall cost to the government as
opposed to paying each ship owner to equip his
ship(s) . [Ref. 78]
g. MSC ships could be provided with equipment which is
technically current and updated with the commercial
market. Obsolescence problem of military GPS UE would
not be applicable.
h. A lot of money is saved on a system by not purchasing
capabilities (e.g., hardening) that are never used.
i. A large number and variety of UE manufacturers are
expected when GPS is operational. The market will be
wide and competition keen. Prices are expected to be
low and competitive with equipment available today.
j. The price of commercial GPS UE is estimated to be 30
per cent to 50 per cent lower than that of military
GPS UE because of less stringent design requirements
[Ref. 80]. (However, as described earlier, the
installation cost in a yard for commercial equipment
is higher than that of an AIT for military equipment.)
k. Most commercial GPS UE will be one-channel UE sets,
with SPS access capability only.
2 . P isadyant ag es
a. Commercial GPS UE is a peacetime system for the STRAT
ships. The ships are not fully prepared to meet their
primary mission (STRAT only)
.
b. Since most commercial GPS UE will be only for SPS
access, MSC ships will still have degraded accuracy
with a possibility of degradation to worse than the
normal 100 meter (2 drms) SPS accuracy. Equipment is
not hardened or militarily prepared in the event of
contingency (STRAT only)
.
c. Commercial GPS UE will not provide commonality between
ships, unless MSC purchases the equipment. There
would be no commonality with the Navy. Lack of
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commonality may make a difference in supplying parts
or spare components, depending on the commercial
company providing the equipment and on the location of
MSC ships.
d. The installation for commercial GPS UE is more
expensive than is the installation for military GPS UE
by an AIT.
e. There is no need to change over if TRANSIT will still
be available. However, the benefits gained from GPS's
continuous coverage, plus those disadvantages that GPS
eliminates as compared to other navigation systems
(see Chapters I and IV) , outweigh not having GPS UE.
Also, reliability of TRANSIT data which may be
available after the end of the phase-out, will not be
guaranteed.
f. With the provision of commercial GPS UE, ships which
are overseas or located in remote areas may be
dependent on the manufacturer's providing or having
service available.
3 . Opt ipns
Two options exist with commercial GPS UE. One is to
retrofit existing (Magnavox) equipment for GPS usage. The
other is to purchase new commercial GPS UE.
a. Option #1 - Purchase New Commercial GPS UE. The
advantages and disadvantages of option one are the
same as those listed above for commercial GPS UE. The
primary disadvantage is the cost of a shipyard
installation.
b. Option #2 - Retrofit Existing Magnavox Equipment.
Magnavox, in addition to producing commercial GPS UE,
plans to produce modification kits so that present
Magnavox receivers (MX-1100 series) can be retrofitted
for current GPS use. Use of MX-1100 series receivers
can then be extended after GPS is operational.
Advantages are that the current GPS, in spite of a
limited satellite constellation can be used sooner.
Also, installation costs are minimal when compared to
complete replacement of a navigation system.
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Foundations and ship structure changes are not
required. [Ref. 43]
Twenty-five to thirty per cent of MSC ships use
Magnavox receivers for TRANSIT. This makes retrofitting of
current Magnavox receivers an attractive alternative to
purchasing new commercial GPS UE. If the decision is made
to equip MSC ships with commercial GPS UE, whether current
Magnavox equipment is replaced with new GPS UE or is
retrofitted with modification kits will depend on the
condition of the current equipment [Ref. 62] and the price
of retrofit kits.
The argument against retrofitting current Magnavox
receivers is that retrofitting is a short term solution, a
stop gap measure [Ref. 6]
.
Having GPS capability sooner by using the current
GPS satellite constellation provides only a few hours of
continuous data per day. Also many more companies are
expected to join the market place when GPS is operational.
But, by waiting, MSC would have a larger base of companies
from which to choose commercial GPS UE.
More important, the primary mission (for STRAT
ships) is ignored for what is perceived to be less up front
costs because the retrofit will still result in equipment
with SPS accuracy only [Ref. 6]. However, Magnavox feels
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that retrofitting is a viable solution, particularly since
it is also felt that many ships do not require military
capabilities such as anti-jamming [Ref . 43]
.
The retrofit, however, because of costs, may be a
suitable solution to chartered ship's owners who are
primarily concerned with the return on investment. But,
because the cost of the retrofit or replacement will be
billed eventually to MSC, the ship owners will go along with
MSC's preference. The costs of purchasing a commercial kit
to modify existing commercial GPS equipment and/or
purchasing new commercial GPS UE are not fully known;
however, retrofitting current equipment has lower initial
outlays.
In summary, the advantages of option two, Magnavox
retrofitting, are:
a. Early use of GPS with current satellite constellation.
b. Retrofit kits provided by a reputable company
(Magnavox) for current MX-1100 series navigation
systems currently used aboard 25 to 30 per cent of
the MSC ships.
c. Cheaper installation done quickly involving a board
addition or replacement and, in some cases, an antenna
change to currently used Magnavox 1100 series models.
The disadvantages of retrofitting are:
a. A stop gap measure for the STRAT ships; and not a
long-term solution.
b. Greater overall cost if retrofitting occurs and
subsequently GPS UE is purchased.
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c. Higher early costs if retrofitting is immediate. With
competition among producers expected to be large, it
may be less expensive to wait and see what will be
available on the commercial market.
4 . Recpmmendat ions
The author recommends first, that MSC purchase
commercial GPS UE in multiple unit buys; second, that the
equipment allow access to PPS; and third, that cabling used
in the installation meet military specifications for the
military MD GPS UE.
Second, the author suggests purchasing commercial
GPS UE for MSS ships, in those cases where military
one-channel LD GPS UE (manpacks) cannot be used. Retrofits
are recommended only when the retrofit would make more sense
than replacing the entire navigation system. For example, a
retrofit is called for if a ship had just had a new non-GPS
system installed and has a short time period left (e.g.,
eight months) in its charter with MSC, and if TRANSIT
phase-out ends in two weeks. In this case, MSC would gain
the benefit of GPS data for the remaining eight months in
the charter period.
F. IMPLICATIONS OF GPS UE SELECTION
The implications of selecting military equipment instead
of commercial equipment are the following:
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a. If military GPS UE is provided to MSC ships, then the
most current technology available in commercial GPS UE
is sacrificed. This assumes that military GPS UE will
be obsolete by the time it is installed on host
vehicles and/or that new technology will not be
incorporated into military user equipment in a timely
manner. Besides, unit-for-unit , the opportunity to
purchase lower priced commercial equipment is lost.
b. If commercial GPS UE is provided, then MSC ships (less
the MSS ships) are not fully prepared to meet their
primary mission. There is still a chance to lose the
ability to meet the primary mission (e.g., a long
range EMP blast could reach a ship transiting alone)
.
Further, in terms of installation, the opportunity to
use AIT and realize savings in installation cost is
lost.
In summary, it is better to provide militarily designed
equipment to MSC ships which are to fulfill the role of
strategic sealift. This includes the STRAT (CUOT, PPF, and
RRF) , NFAF, and SMS ships.
As stated before, the NFAF and SMS ships are already
funded and scheduled to receive military GPS UE. The STRAT
ships are not. The bottom line is whether a peacetime or
military navigation system will be provided, and whether DOD
willing to pay for militarily designed navigation equipment
for these ships.
In the author's judgement, as long as the primary
mission is strategic sealift, then the STRAT ships, as well
as the NFAF and SMS ships, must be equipped with military
GPS UE to fulfill the mission. There is still the chance
that, during a contingency, a long range EMP burst could
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knock out the navigation electronics. This means that
military GPS UE must be provided to STRAT ships, especially
to the PPF ships: MPS's, FSS's, and later to T-ACS's,
T-AVB's and T-AH's. Military GPS UE should also be provided
to CUOT and RRF ships. Should it be decided that commercial
GPS UE is to be used, then, as stated above, cabling should
be installed which can be used for military GPS UE and/or
the commercial PPS capability, and the equipment should be
hardened to some minimum degree. The MSS ships, which
provide peacetime mission support and are not involved in
the strategic sealift mission, should be equipped with
commercial UE, except when military manpacks could be used.
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FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER V
45The term phase-out is used to describe a
transition time period. From beginning to completion of the
phase-out, the government will fully operate and maintain
the existing r adionavigation system (for instance TRANSIT).
However, new developments and improvements will not be made
to the system. At the end of the phase-out period the
government will no longer attempt to keep the system fully
operational [Ref . 10] . Therefore, those who use TRANSIT as
a principal source of navigation can do so throughout the
phase-out time period, but will need to be equipped with GPS
UE at the end of phase-out [Ref. 6],
4°user set response times are measured in two
parameters: reaction time (REAC) and time-to-first-fix
(TTFF) . REAC is defined as the elapsed time from UE set
turn-on until the first full accuracy data output. TTFF is
defined as the elapsed time from the initial demand on a UE
set that has been turned on for a minimum of seven minutes
to a subsequent data output and display. Specific response
times [Ref. 18:pp. 32-33] are shown below:
Military GPS UE Type REAC TTF
LD Set 10.5 min 5.5 rnin
MD Set 9.0 min 4.0 min
Minutes saved in response 1.5 1.5





The purpose of this thesis was to study plans to
incorporate NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) User
Equipment (UE) on Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships. MSC
functional ship groups which are funded and scheduled, and
those not funded nor scheduled for military GPS UE were
identified. Alternatives for equipping unfunded/unscheduled
MSC ships were examined emphasizing major considerations and
implications in the alternatives selected for all ships in
the MSC fleet.
GPS, a world-wide all-weather navigation system which
determines position, velocity, and time with greater
accuracy than any current system, is applicable to the needs
of both military and civilian communities. Further, it has
been selected by the U.S. Government as the candidate
radionavigation system to replace and/or supplement all
other radionavigation systems currently in use.
The need for military GPS UE in Navy platforms is
implicitly identified in the military GPS UE installation
schedule (POM-86 Decision Package) . MSC functional ship
groups included for military GPS UE are the Naval Fleet
Auxiliary Force (NFAF) and Special Mission Support (SMS)
ships. MSC ship groups which are not funded or scheduled
are the Strategic Sealift (STRAT) ships and Miscellaneous
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Service Support (MSS) ships. The STRAT ships include the
Common User Ocean Transportation (CUOT) ships, the
Prepositioning Force (PPF) and the Ready Reserve Force
(RRF)
.
4 ^ The PPF, in turn, is composed of the Maritime
Prepositioning Ships (MPS's), Fast Sealift Support (FSS)
ships, and Near Term Prepositioning Force (NTPF) ships.
A. CONCLUSION
Because of the identified need and plans of GPS UE on
Naval platforms, the status of the GPS program in its
anticipated continuation into Phase III production, and the
phase-out plans of navigation systems currently in use, MSC
ships also must be considered for GPS UE. While military
GPS UE is identified for NFAF and SMS ships (approximately
50 ships) , the STRAT and MSS ships (approximately 125 ships)
need a viable alternative if military GPS UE is not
provided. A decision is required regarding whether STRAT
and MSS ships should be equipped with military or commercial
GPS UE.
Important in considering whether to provide military or
commercial GPS UE to MSC ships, particularly to STRAT ships,
is MSC's role in providing sealift as one of three major
functions of the Navy. Developments in the Middle East
during the mid to latter 1970 's resulted in a surge of
interest in strategic sealift and in mobilization planning.
As a result, the emphasis today is clearly on strategic
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sealift, strategic mobilization, and contingency planning.
Because of the increased focus on sealift, MSC's primary
mission is to provide sealift for strategic mobility in
support of national security objectives.
The basic question in deciding to provide MSC ships with
military or with commercial GPS UE is whether to equip them
with a GPS navigation system that is militarily designed and
prepared for contingencies or to provide strictly peacetime
(commercial) GPS UE. In the author's judgement military or
commercial GPS UE must be selected on the basis of being
able to fulfill the strategic sealift mission. Primary
criteria for selection are equipment characteristics and
technological capabilities. Security is an issue which must
be addressed aboard MSC ships. Cost, equipment
availability, and GPS program and DOD radionavigation
systems phase-out schedules are additional factors to weigh.
In the author's judgement, because the primary mission
is strategic sealift and because in the fulfillment of that
mission MSC ships could be vulnerable, (even though it is
recognized that the idea is to use, for instance, MPS ships
in safe passage) , there is a need to provide militarily
designed GPS UE. Further, as long as the possibility exists
that the government can degrade Standard Positioning Service
(SPS) accuracy to worse than 100 meters, MSC ships involved
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in strategic sealift (STRAT, NFAF, and SMS ships) must have
access to Precise Positioning Service (PPS)
.
Military GPS UE fully meets mission requirements. The
equipment is militarily prepared and is part of the
commonality objective set by the Department of Defense
(DOD) . Also, if the equipment is installed allowing SPS
accuracy only, it can be adapted quickly for PPS accuracy by
providing the key/access code. Moreover, AIT pierside
installation offers the advantage of substantial savings
when compared to shipyard installation. This can defray the
cost of purchasing military GPS UE. Commercial GPS UE
offers the advantages of PPS accessability (if equipment
purchased has this capability) , the opportunity to purchase
equipment with the most current features and technology
available, and the traditional way of conducting business
between MSC and commercial ship owners. Because MSC's
primary mission is strategic sealift and because of the
advantages of military GPS UE, equipping MSC STRAT ships
with the latter (particularly the PPF ships and also ships
which could be involved with strategic sealift which have
long-term time charters) , will fully provide these ships




The following recommendations are made.
Military GPS UE should be provided to MSC ships involved
in strategic sealift. This includes the STRAT ships (with
particular emphasis on the PPF ships and those ships under
long-term charter) , NFAF ships, and SMS ships.
If commercial GPS UE is selected, the following should
be furnished: military-type cabling, capability for PPS
accuracy access, and equipment hardening to at least some
minimum degree. Besides being prepared in terms of
navigation equipment to fully meet MSC's primary mission, an
additional advantage of these provisions is that the
preparedness of the U.S. flag ships will be enhanced to meet
contingency and mobilization requirements.
Commercial GPS UE, and where possible, military (or
commercial equivalent) low dynamic (LD) manpacks should be
provided on MSS vessels. Whenever possible, multiple-unit
purchases should be made for commercial equipment by MSC.
A cost benefit analysis comparing military versus
commercial GPS UE in terms of use, procurement, and
installation would avail information and should be
conducted. When conducted, it should determine the costs
and benefits to DOD as a whole, as opposed to only MSC or to
only the GPS program. Such an analysis probably could be
made after the award of the military GPS UE production
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contract and successful Phase III approval, and when
commercial producers have GPS UE available for general
marine navigation.
Specific ship requirements for military GPS UE in the
the MSC STRAT ships should be identified and submitted in
the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) . Requirements for the POM
should be presented in sufficient time to allow funding and
installation prior to the end of the phase-out of TRANSIT.
MSC ship charters should specify a requirement for GPS
UE when GPS is operational with two-dimensional capability
(scheduled for 1987) .
Finally, GPS navigation should be included in the
enhancement programs for PPF and RRF ships.
129
FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER VI
4^As described in Chapter I, ships in the RRF, a




MSC FLEET (MSC CONTROLLED FLEET)
Chapter I stated that ships in the MSC Fleet are
categorized and discussed in either one of two ways. The
thesis refers to ships differentiated by the four functional
groups [Refs. 2;11]. This section describes the alternative
and more traditional way to categorize MSC ships.
Here, the MSC Fleet is called the MSC Controlled
Fleet. 48 ' 49 It consists of (see Figure A-l): 50
1. MSC Nucleus Ships (also called the MSC Nucleus
Fleet) : These are United States Naval Ships (designated
USNS) which are owned by the U.S. Government or under
bareboat charter to MSC (the United States) . They are in
the custody of the Navy, and permanently assigned to MSC for
administration and operation. The ships are active status
in-service ships, which are either MSC government civil
service manned (MSC/CIVMARS) with DOD/MSC merchant mariners,
or contract-operated with commercial merchant marine crews.
MSC is the agent for these ships and provides or arranges
all husbanding.
2. MSC Chartered51 -Ships (also called the MSC
Controlled (Chartered) Fleet) : These are commercial
privately-owned ships of the U.S. Merchant Marine (U.S. flag
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Occasionally, they are foreign flag ships chartered by MSC.
Ship designation is usually SS (steamship) , MV (motor
vessel) or (a few) RV (research vessel). The ships are
manned with contract-operated, commercial merchant mariners
MSC conducts liaison with the ships' agents who husband
them.
3. General Agency Agreement (GAA) Ships: These are
ships in the custody of the Maritime Administration (MARAD)
which have been activated.
133
FOOTNOTES FOR APPENDIX A
48 Sources: [Refs. 53:para 1-1-1, p. l-l;72:para 4,
p. 1; 85: par a 5, pp. 1-2]
49Unless activated, a Ready Reserve Force (RRF) ship
(47 ships as of 19 October 1984) is not part of the MSC
Controlled Fleet. This is slightly different from what is
listed in the inventory and from the categorization of MSC
ships by functional groups where RRF ships are included, but
in a reserve status. [Ref. 2]
5^A fourth category consists of in-commission ships
(USS) of the U.S. Navy temporarily assigned to MSC for
operations. If so assigned, although they are
MSC-controlled ships, they are not MSC nucleus ships.




1- Barebpat_ Char ter . Basically MSC rents an empty ship.
The ship owner relinquishes control and management of the
vessel to the chartering agency (MSC) for a number of years
(often for the ship's entire expected service life). MSC is
responsible for all costs of operating and for equipping the
ship, as well as for maintenance and repairs. MSC pays
"hire" which is expressed in terms of dollars per deadweight
ton per month, or dollars per day.
2. Time_ Char ter . In a time charter, MSC hires a fully
equipped and manned ship for a specific period of time. The
charter term varies from a few weeks to years. Unlike
bareboat charters, the ship owner is responsible for hiring
the crew, managing the ship, and paying all operating costs
except fuel, port charges, and canal tolls. MSC, as the
charterer, directs utilization of the ship. MSC schedules
services of the ship in any location and for any cargo it
chooses, except as prohibited in the charter agreement.
"Hire" is the same as in bareboat, except when the ship is
not available for service ("off-hire"). If the charter
period is for more than a year, there is usually a provision
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for increases in payment for crew wages, stores, and
subsistence.
3. Cons ecutiye_ypyac[e_ Charter . In a voyage charter, MSC
basically rents "space" onboard the ship for carriage of
cargo. The ship owner remains completely responsible for
the operation and cost of the ship (including fuel and port
charges) . The charter allows for the ship to make as many
consecutive voyages as it can in a specified period of time.
Payment is in terms of "freight," which is expressed in
dollars per ton of cargo carried. It is normally payable
only on the successful discharge of cargo at the end of a
voyage. If MSC, as the charterer, does not supply a full
cargo, MSC pays freight on unused space. There is usually a
provision for payment of escalation of crew wages, bunkers,
stores, and subsistence.
4. Sing!e_Vpyage_ Char ter . Also called a spot charter,
this charter is like the consecutive voyage charter except
that it involves one shipment or one voyage instead of
several.
Sources: [Refs. 71:para 1-1-4, p. l-3;86]
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APPENDIX C
MILITARY GPS UE SET COMPONENTS
The following identifies and describes major components
in military GPS UE sets. As stated in Chapter II, the
primary component LRUs for a nominal military GPS UE set are
the antenna, RPU, CDU and FMI [Ref. 4:pp. 8-11].
1 • Antenna/Antenna_ Elect rpnics
The antenna and antenna electronics are separate LRU's.
The antenna receives signals transmitted from the GPS
satellites and transfers them to a preamplifier or Antenna
Control Unit (ACU) . For the purpose of definition, the
antenna is defined as a combination of receptor elements,
radomes, and supporting structure(s) for the elements, as
well as internal cables and antenna signal connectors. Two
generic antenna types are available for use in UE. The
fixed reception pattern antenna (FRPA) is an antenna that is
fixed with respect to the antenna structure. It does not
have the capability of modifying its reception pattern and
is a simple omni-directional antenna with a deep null at the
horizon. The controlled reception pattern antenna (CPRA)
,
also called an adaptive array antenna, is a multiple element
array antenna. In conjunction with the associated ACU, it
has the ability to modify the reception pattern in order to
reject interference signals and/or emphasize GPS navigation
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signals. The CPRA can detect the direction of the jamming
source under jamming conditions, and quickly alter receiving
patterns to place nulls in the jam direction. The type of
antenna for ships discussed in this thesis is the FRPA,
which will be mounted on the mast.
The preamplifier or ACU processes RF signals and outputs
them in the proper form to be accepted and utilized by the
Receiver Processor Unit (RPU) . The basic functions are to
increase the signal level from the antenna, reject
interference by filtering, and provide input burnout
protection and self-test functions. Additionally, the ACU
combines the signals from the various antenna elements and
negates jamming signals.
2. Receiver_Prpcessor_Unit_j[RPUl
The RPU, a micro-computer consisting of approximately 80
per cent software, performs signal and data processing
[Ref. 17:p. 13]. Three RPU variations are available:
a. Low dynamic (LD) (one channel) , manpack vehicular:
The LD set tracks and monitors four satellites
sequentially.
b. Medium dynamic (MD) (two channels) : The MD set
channels sequentially track and monitors two
satellites each.
c. High dynamic (HD) (five channels) : The HD set tracks
and monitors four satellites simultaneously.
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Each variation of the RPU's will perform the following
functions:
a. Receive and amplify signals from the preamplifier or
ACU and four desired satellites.
b. Select and acquire signals from four desired
satellites.
c. Track acquired navigation signals (four simultaneously
for the five-channel set, four sequentially for the
one- and two-channel sets)
.
d. Extract navigation data from the GPS satellite data
received.
e. Measure signal propagation error.
f. Compute position, velocity, and time.
g. Output necessary data to the host vehicle integrated
system through the Flexible Modular Interface Unit
(FMI) .
h. Accept navigation sensor aiding data from the FMI.
i. Provide resistance to jamming.
j. Generate self-test signals for UE fault isolation.
k. Provide additional functions as required by platform
configurations and mission.
3 . F2 ex ib 1 e_ Mpduj a r_ Interface. Un i t_ 4 FMII
The FMI will perform the interfacing function between
the RPU and the platform. This includes all vehicle-unique
interfaces and all mission-unique or vehicle-unique
functions not performed by the RPU. The FMI will provide
the GPS UE with the capability of interfacing with both
analog and digital platform equipment, and may contain a
micro-processor for data manipulation where required. The
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FMI for each platform will be designed to meet the unique
requirements of that platform. These unique designs will be
based on the requirement to- use replaceable components
common to all FMIs. This function partitioning approach
will allow for commonality in the use of the other LRU's
across many Navy and tri-service applications, while
supporting platform-unique requirements in the platform
unique FMIs.
The complexity of design of a unique FMI is heavily
dependent upon the resident navigation system configuration,
the quality and types of navigation instruments (displays
and controls) to be used, and the electrical interface
characteristics of the host vehicle. Since the LD set is
not integrated with other host vehicle navigation systems,
it does not require an FMI.
4
.
Test_ Flexible. Modular. Interface_iTest_FMJl
The Test FMI allows the inherent fault isolation
capabilities of the GPS UE to be extended from the LRU level
to the intermediate level of maintenance to be performed





The CDU provides the operator with the capability to
control the UE, input data, and observe UE-generated
outputs. The GPS CDU contains operating controls, a data
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entry keyboard, and alpha numeric displays. The CDU is
functionally partitioned from the RPU to permit operation of
the sets without the CDU in platforms designed to control
the GPS UE via an existing platform control system. For
shipboard applications, the GPS CDU will be either located
with the RPU or mounted in some other location (e.g.,





The DLU may be used to enter mission-dependent data
(e.g., way points) into the UE set to alleviate operator
workload. It will be composed of a data loader receptable
that will be installed into the host vehicle and a data
memory unit cartridge which will be used to enter mission
data into the receptacle. A DLU cannot be used with the LD
set. Since its primary purpose is to reduce operator





Each of the GPS UE LRU's will be capable of being
mounted individually or as part of a group of LRU's. The
HCU provides the physical mounting and connector interface
between the GPS UE and the platform. For most shipboard
applications, all of the LRU's (with the exception of the
antenna/antenna electronics, remote CDU if applicable, and
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possibly the local GPS CDU) , will be contained in one



























Air Force Logistics Command
Air Force Systems Command
Augment Installation Team
Assistant Secretary of the Navy
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Financial Management
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Manpower, Installations, and Logistics
Course Acquisition Code
Chemical, Biological, and Radiation
Computer Configuration Sub-Board
Control Display Unit
Civil Service (Government) Merchant Mariner
Chief of Naval Operations
Consolidated Shipboard Allowance List
Controlled Reception Pattern Antenna
Common User Ocean Transportation
Calendar Year
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations

































Deviations (Distance) Root Mean Square
Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council
Development, Test, and Evaluation
David Taylor Naval Ship Research and
Development Center
Electromagnetic Pulse




Follow-on Test and Evaluation
Fixed Price Incentive Fee
Federal Radionavigation Plan
Fixed Reception Pattern Antenna
Full Scale Development
Fast Sealift Support





























Global Positioning System User Equipment
High Dynamic
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Joint Configuration Control Board
Joint Program Office
Joint Service System Management Office







Manpower, Installations, and Logistics
Military Specifications
Military Van
Mobile Logistics Support Force
Maritime Prepositioning Ship
Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics
Military Sealift Command
MSC Civil Service (Government) Merchant
Mariner
Military Sealift Command Europe
Military Sealift Command Office




























Mean Time Between Maintenance
Motor Vessel
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NAVAIRSYSCOM) Naval Air Systems Command
( NAVEL EXSYSCOM) Naval Electronics Systems
Command
Naval Logistics Command Pacific
Chief of Naval Material
Naval Oceanographic Command
Naval Oceanographic Office
(NAVSEASYSCOM) Naval Sea Systems Command
Navy Space Surveillance System
Naval Supply Systems Command
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Navy Configuration Control Board
Naval Control of Shipping Organization
Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force
Navy Industrial Fund
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association
National Oceanic Industries Association
Naval Ocean Research and Development
Analysis
Naval Ocean System Center
Navy Program Manager
Near Term Prepositioning Force



























Office of Primary Responsibility
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Precise Code
Program Manager
















Spherical Error of Probability
Secretary of the Navy
System Manager



























Strategic Sealift (ship group)
Auxiliary Crane Ship (STRAT)
Ammunition ship (NFAF)
Fleet Stores Ship (NFAF)
Combat Stores Ship (NFAF)
Navigation Test Support (SMS)
Missile Range Instrumentation Ship (SMS)
Oceanographic Research Ship (SMS)
Ocean Surveillance Ship (NFAF)
Surveying Ship (SMS)
Hospital Ship (STRAT)
Freighter (Cargo Ship) (STRAT) , Undersea
Cable Transporter Cargo Ship (SMS)
Fleet Ballistic Resupply Ship (NFAF)




Cable Repair Ship (SMS)
Fleet Ocean Tug (NFAF)
Aviation Intermediate Maintenance and Supply
Ship (ROFLO Cargo/Container Ship, also
called Maintenance Aviation/Supply Ship)
(STRAT)



















United States Air Force
United States Marine Corps
United States Naval Ship
World Geodetic System
Warner Robbins Air Logistics Center
149
LIST OF REFERENCES
1. ARINC Research Corporation, GPS_UE_ Installation
Schedules_pecisipn_Packa3e_POMr86 , 7 August 19 84.
2. Military Sealift Command, Cpmmander_Military_Sealif
t




3. Military Sealift Command, Ship_pesi3n_&_Cpnyersipn
P iy i s ipn_ Repp r t_pn_ New_ Ship_ Con s t r uc t ipn_ &_ Conversion
PjPSJaiis, October 19 84.
4. Naval Air Development Center, GPS_Phase_III_Intecjra;;
t ipn_ Concepts. fp r_ Ship_ Plat forms , May 1982.
5. Interview Jim Kindig, Systems Control Technology, Inc.,
El Segundo, CA, 7 December 1984.
6. Interview with CDR Kenneth A. Aanerud, USN and
Charley Allen, NAVSTAR Joint Program Office (JPO) Space
Division, El Segundo, Los Angeles, CA, 29 August 1984.
7. Interview with LCDR James Kain, USCG, NAVSTAR Joint
Program Office (JPO), Space Division, El Segundo,
Los Angeles, CA, 14 November 1984.
8. COL John H. Martel, USAF, Office of the Secretary of
Defense (C 3 I) , "DOD Policies," presentation at the
Global Positioning System (GPS) Symposium,
Arlington, VA, 21-22 April 1983.
9. U.S. Department of Defense (OUSDRE) and U.S. Department
of Transportation (DPB-22) , Report DOD-4650 .4-P-I/
DOT-TSC-RSPA-81-12- 1 , Feder al_ Radio. Nay igat ipn_ Plan_j
Vol ume_I_lQ f_ 41 j. Rad ipnay i cj at ipn_ P 1 ans_ and_ Pp 1 i cy
,
March 1982.
10. Interview with Mr. William L. Fink, Maritime
Administration, Washington, DC, 10 September 1984.
11. Military Sealift Command, Backs rounder , 19 84.
12. Manning, Larry C., "Sealift Readiness: You Don't Get
What You Don't Pay For," U_. S_._ Nayal_ Institute
Proceedings, Vol. 107/10/94 4, October 19 81.
150
13. VADM T.J. Hughes, Jr., USN, DCNO for Logistics (OP-04),
presentation at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
CA, 1 November 1984.
14. Interview with LCDR T. Witte, USN, Strategic Sealift
Division (OP-422) , Washington, DC, 7 November 1984.
15. Interview with CDR Jim McHood, USN, Navy Space Division
(OP-943) , Washington, DC, 13 November 1984.
16. Interview with Jim Kindig, Systems Control Technology,
Los Angeles, CA, 16 November 1984.
17. Abrahamson, Thomas D. and Mauer, Gerald M., Jr.,
A_ C r i t igu e_p f_ NAVSTAR_ Glpb a1_ Pp s i t ipn inp_ Sy s t enu _ User
Eg u ipmen tj _ Con f ip u r a t ipn_ Con t rp 1_ fp r_ DOD_ Cpmmpn_ and
Nayy_Unipue_ Items, M.S. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, CA, 19 83.
18. Space Navigation Systems, NAVSTAR Global Positioning
System Joint Program Office, NAYSTAR_ Global
Pos i t ipninp_ System_ Us erls_ Overview, September 1982.
19. Smith, Bruce A., "NAVSTAR Tests to Validate Receiver
Sets," Aviatipn_ We ek_ and_ Spa c e_ Te c hnolppy , Vo 1 . 119,
No. 13, 26 September 19 83.
20. Stansell, Thomas A., Jr., "Civil GPS From a Future
Perspective," P rpc e ed inp s_p f_ the_ I n s t i t u t e_ of
Elect r ical_ and_ Electrpnics_ Enp ineers , Vol . 71,
No. 10, October 1983.
21. Grunthal, Melvyn C, GPS_Cpntrpl_ fpr_Hydrop raphip
Suryeys_-_An_ Overview, paper presented at the
National Ocean Service Symposium HYDRO- 1 84,
Rockville, MD, April 1984.
22. Military Sealift Command Pacific, Ocean_Echp,
June 1984.
23. Commander Military Sealift Command Instruction 3000. 1C,
Sh ip_ Mov ernen t s_pn_ t he_ Ou tb r e a k_p f_ Wa r_p r_ uppn_ Future
Depi a r at ipn_p f_ Eme rp ency , 1 June 1977.
24. Interview with CAPT R. W. Kesteloot, USN, Deputy Chief
of Naval Operations (OP-42) , Washington, DC,
2 August 1984.
25. Military Sealift Command, Bap kprpunder , 19 84.
151
26. Commander Military Sealift Command Memorandum, Status
R§PP r t_pn_ rg an i z a t ipna1_ and_ Adm i n i s t r at iy e_ Matters
,
19 July 1984.
27. RADM Hamm, Warren C, Jr., USN, Deputy Commander,
Military Sealift Command, "The Role of MSC," speech
presented at the Navy League's 1982 Naval Warfare
Seminar, Washington, DC, 7 April 1982.
28. Military Sealift Command, Military. Seal ift_ Command
Brief, April 19 84.
29. MAJ Stewart, Richard A., USMC, "Ships That Can
Del ive r , " U.. S^. _ Nayal_ Ins t i tut e_ Proceed inss
,
Vol. 110/11/981, November 1984.
30. Jane^ s_Fightins_ Ships_1984z85 , Jane's Publishing Co.,
1984.
31. Interview with CDR Corydon Gifford, USN, Readiness
Office (M-3R) , Military Sealift Command,
Washington, DC, 15 November 1984.
32. Interview with CDR Robert Kagenbruch, USN, Military
Sealift Command Office Port Canaveral, Mayport, FL,
29 November 1984.
33. Interview with Mr. W. Lockard, Maritime Administration,
Washington, DC, 14 November 1984.
34. Interview with Mr. E.J. Krochalis," Strategic Mobility
Office (M-6) , Military Sealift Command, Washington, DC,
15 November 19 84.
35. Keegan, Richard, The_Glpbal_Ppsitipnin3_System_and
Its_App2icatipn_ tp_Phpt.p5rammet.ry, paper presented at
the XV International Congress of Photogrammetry and
Remote Sensing, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,
17-19 June 1984.
36. Montgomery, Bradley 0., "NAVSTAR GPS - A Giant Step For
Navigation and Positioning," Sea_Technplpcjy, Vol. 25,
No. 3, March 1984.
37. Elson, Benjamin M. , "Transoceanic Flight Shows GPS
Uses," Ay i at ipn_ Wee k_ and_ Spa c e_ Te c hnology , Vo 1 . 119,
No. 4, 25 July 1983.
38. Stansell, T.A., Jr., Update_pn_Ciyil_GPS, Magnavox
Advanced Products and Systems Company, 1983.
15:
39. Naval Air Development Center, GPS_Phase_JII_Intea:ra_
t i on_ Concepts_ fp r_ Gepphy s i c a1_ Su ryey_ and_ Undersea
Su ry e ill ance_ Platforms, May 19 82.
40. Rockwell International, 5M-WP-5-84, NAYSTAR- Global
Pos i t ion i ncj_ Sy s tem_ Cpl 1 i ns_ Us e r_ Epu ipmen t , 19 84.
41. Kalafus, Rudolph M. ; Vilcans, Janis; and Knable,
Norman, "Differential Operation of NAVSTAR GPS,"
Jpurnal_pf_the Instit.ute_pf_Nayi3at.ipn, Vol. 30,
No. 3, Fall 1983.
42. Stansell, Thomas A., Jr., GPS_Ma r i ne_ Us er_ Equipment,
paper presented at the Global Civil Satellite
Navigation Systems Conference, The Royal Institute of
Navigation, London, UK, 22 May 1984.
43. Interview with Thomas A. Stansell Jr. and Emile W.
Achee, Magnavox Advanced Products and Systems Company,
Torrance, CA, 28 August 1984.
44. Interview with Victor Vargas, Magnavox Advanced
Products and Systems Company, Torrance, CA,
7 December 1984.
45. Interview with Lloid M. Pearson, Navidyne, Newport
News, VA, 2 November 19 84.
46. Interview with Charles P. Morgan, Collins Government
Avionics Division, Rockwell International, Cedar
Rapids, IA, 14 November 1984.
47. U.S. Congress, 98th Congress, 1st Session, Concurrent
Resplutipn_190
.
48. Texas Instruments, MVSTAR_GPS_Nayi3atipn_Prpducts
Sys tems_ P r i c e_ List , 1 July 1984.
49. Texas Instruments AW-6-83, Texas_ Inst ruments_TI- 4 100
NAYSTAR_ Nay ig ato r , 19 83.
50. Dunn, Penny D. and Higgs, Robert H., Benefits_pf
E a r!y_ Impl ernent a t ipn_p f_ a_ Glpbal_ Pps i t ipn i ncj_ Sy s tem
fp r_ Hyd rpcj r aph i c_ Su ryeys , paper presented at the
National Ocean Service Symposium HYDRO- '84,
Rockville, MD, April 1984.
51. Interview with Lloid M. Pearson, Navidyne, Newport
News, VA, 10 December 19 84.
153
52. Stansell, T.A., Jr., "Civil Marine Applications of the
Global Positioning System, Journal_pf_the_ Institute
of_ Nayig at ion , Vol . 2 5, No . 2 , Summe r 1978.
53. Commander Military Sealift Command Instruction 3120. 2D,
Adm i n i s t r at iy e_ and_ Op e r at ing_ P roc edure s_ fp r_ MSC_ Civil
Sery ice_ Manned_ Sh ips_l USNS1 , 1 2 Decembe r 1979.
54. Kuebler, Wolf and Sommers, Sharon, "A Critical Review
of the Fix Accuracy and Reliability of Electronic
Marine Navigation Systems," Jpurnal_pf_the_ Institute
of_ Nay igat ion , Vol . 2 9, No . 2 , Summe r 1982.
55. Interview with Mr. Brad Taylor, Military Sealift
Command, Washington, DC, 13 November 1984.
56. Booda, Larry L., "Integration of U.S. Radionavigation
Syst ems , " S ea_ Technplppy , Vol . 23, No. 3, March 1982.
57. Logsdon, Tom and Helms, Charles W. , Comparisons
Between_ the_ Capabilities.p f_ the_ NAYSTAR_ GP S_ and_ Other
Ppe r at ipnal_ Radipnay ip; a t ipn_ Sys t ems
,
pape r pr ese n t ed
at EASCON '81, Washington, DC, 16 November 1981.
58. U.S. Department of Defense (OUSDRE) and U.S. Department
of Transportation (DPB-22) , Report DOD-4650 .4-P-III/
DOT-TSC-RSPA-81-12-II I, Federal_Radip_ Navigation
P 1 an_t
_Yp 1 ume_ 1 1 1_ip f_ 4i : Rad ipnay ig at ipn_ Sy s t e
m
Characteristics , March 1982.
59. Interview with Mr. W.C. Mears, Military Sealift
Command, Washington, DC, 13 July 1984.
60. Interview with Mr. Glen Wells, Military Sealift Command
Pacific, Oakland, CA, 23 August 1984.
61. Interview with Henry Kowalski, Military Sealift Command
Pacific, Oakland, CA, 13 August 1984.
62. Interview with Henry Kowalski, Military Sealift Command
Pacific, Oakland, CA, 2 November 1984.
63. Interview with Mr. D. Stein, Military Sealift Command,
Washington, DC, 23 October 1984.
64. Interview with Mr. Dick Holms, Air Force Eastern Space
Missile Command, Cocoa Beach, FL, 29 November 1984.
65. Interview with LT Malcomb Baird, USAF, Operations Test
Support Unit II, Cocoa Beach, FL.
154
66. Interview with CAPT Michael Kubishen, Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations (OP-375) , Washington, DC,
7 December 1984.
67. Military Sealift Command, New_ Ship_ Const rue tipn_ and
Conye r s ipn_ P
r
gg r ams_ Status_ Repp r t , Janua ry 19 83.
68. Interview with Cy Weber, Military Sealift Command,
Washington, DC, 13 July 1984.
69. Interview with Jim Daniels, Texas Instruments,
Lewisville, TX, 23 August 1984.
70. Koburger, CAPT C.W., Jr., "Marine Navigation in
Wartime: A Preliminary Survey," Jpurnal_pf_ the
I nstitute_pf_ Navigation, Vol. 29, No. 4,
Winter 1982-83.
71. Commander Military Sealift Command Instruction 3121. 3D,
Tank e r_ Ope r at i ng_ Instructions. i TANKpP I NSI
,
4 March 1977.
72. Commander Military Sealift Command Instruction 3120.17,




73. Interview with Major Renato Giordano, Italian Air
Force, User Equipment Engineering, NAVSTAR Joint
Program Office (JPO) , Space Division, El Segundo,
Los Angeles, CA, 3 December 1984.
74. Maine, Reuben L., "A Marine NAVSTAR GPS Receiver,"
JP
u
IBa1_p f_ t he_ In s t i tu t e_p f_ Nay i cj at ion , Vo1 . 2 8,
No. 4, Winter 1981-82.
75. Feldman, D. , "Experiments in Marine Navigation with
NAVSTAR - GPS Satellites," Opean_ Management
,
July 1981.
76. Interview with Cy Weber, Military Sealift Command,
Washington, DC, 2 November 1984.
77. Commander Military Sealift Command, Washington, DC
message, Shipppard_ Security , 102338Z January 1983.
78. Interview with Cy Weber, Military Sealift Command,
Washington, DC, 5 November 19 84.
155
79. Air Force Systems Command Space Divisions, GPS, Joint
Program Office, U_. S_. _ Nayy_ NAVSTAR_ Us e r_ Segment^
P has e_ 1 1 1_ Hp s t_Veh i cl e_ As s 13ned_ RDT & E_ I ny e s tment_ and





80. Interview with J.W. Williams, Magnavox Advanced
Products and Systems Company, Torrance, CA,
10 December 19 84.
81. ARINC Research Corporation, Engineering Note
1727 -80-7 9, Cpmpar ispn_pf_ Ins tall at ipns_fpr_ Shipboard
ElPPtrpnics_Similar_tp_GPS_User_Eguipment, May 19 80.
82. Amos, Kevis S., Installatipn_Pptipns_fpr_the_NAVSTAR
G2pbal_ Pp s i t ipn ing_ Sy s t em_ i n_ Su r f ace_ S h ips
,
M.S. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA,
1984.
83. Interview with Cy Weber, Military Sealift Command,
Washington, DC, 9 November 1984.
84. Interview with Charly Falchetti, Naval Air Development
Center, Warminster, PA, 29 November 1984.
85. Commander Military Sealift Command Instruction 3121. IE,






Ships_iless_ tanker si , 26 November 1976.
86. Military Sealift Command, "United States Navy's
Military Sealift Command," United. States_Nayyls
M il i t a ry_ S ea
1
i£ t_ Cpmmand_ I nformatipn_ Kit , 1979.
156
BIBLIOGRAPHY
ARINC Research Publication, 1727-04-5-2225, Develppment_and
APP11P at ipn_p f_ Sh ipbpa r d_ E 1 ec t rpn i c_ E3 u ipment_ Iiistallatipn
1 SEESTALLl_ Co s t_ Mpd e 1_ fp r_ NAV£TAR_ Glob a1_ Pp s i t ipn i ng
System, June 1980.
Collins Government Avionics Division, Rockwell
International, The_ Globa 1_ Pp s i t ion in^_ Sy s tem , 19 84.
Commander Military Sealift Command Notice 3110, Assignment
P f_MSC_Ships_ and_ Service. Craft , 1 October 1984.
Commander Military Sealift Command Report 3110-3, Summary of
Chartered Ships, 15 September 1984.
Geophysical Service Inc., Glpba1_ Posit ion incj_ Services,
March 1984.
Hemesath, N.B., Pe rJo rmanc e_ En hancement s_p f_ GP S_ User
Equipment, paper presented at the International
Telemetering Conference, Las Vegas, NV, 22-24 October 1978.
Interview with CAPT Jackson, Master, USNS Sealift Pacific,
Los Angeles, CA, 29 November 1984.
Interview with John Oswald, ITECH, International Technology
Limited, Anchorage, AK, August 1984.




1. Defense Technical Information Center
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
2. Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange
U.S. Army Logistics Management Center
Fort Lee, Virginia 23801








5. Professor W.H. Cullin, Code 54Ck
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943
6. Professor D.C. Boger, Code 54Bk
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943
7. CDR K.A. Aanerud, Code YES




Los Angeles, California 90009
8. Chief of Naval Operations
Logistics (OP-04)
Department of the Navy
Washington, DC 20350
158
9. Chief of Naval Operations
Strategic Sealift Division (OP-42)
Department of the Navy
Washington, DC 20350
10. Commander 1
Military Sealift Command (M-4E5)
Attn: Mr. Cy Weber
Department of the Navy
Washington, DC 20390
11. Commander 1
Military Sealift Command (M-6)
Attn: Mr. E.J. Krochalis
Department of the Navy
Washington, DC 20390
12. Commander 1
Military Sealift Command (M-l)
Attn: CDR V. Curry, USN
Department of the Navy
Washington, DC 20390
13. Commander 1
Military Sealift Command Pacific (P-3TX)
Attn: Mr. T. Yamato
Oakland, California 94625
14. Commander 1
Military Sealift Command Pacific (P-4E5)
Attn: Mr. H. Kowalski
Oakland, California 94625




























tion of plans to
incoporate NAVSTAR
Global Positioning
System user equipment
on Military Sealift
Command ships.

